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Abstract 
Over the last few years, the safety record of U.S. commercial airlines has improved to the 
point where the statistics on accidents are negligible. The overwhelming numbers of aviation 
fatalities occur in General Aviation (GA) accidents. While the fatal accident rate has improved—
from around 5.0 per 100,000 miles flown in the post–World War II era to varying between 1.2 
and 1.5 since 1996—it still results in 450 to 700 deaths per year. In 2013, improving GA safety 
was on the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB’s) most wanted list. 
The NTSB has cited a lack of aeronautical knowledge as the cause of many of these 
accidents. If pilots are required to pass Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) knowledge and 
practical tests prior to obtaining a new pilot certificate, how could they not possess the 
knowledge needed to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS)? Some, attributing it to a 
failure to learn basic aeronautical knowledge, are concerned that potential pilots memorize the 
answers to test questions published in commercially available test guides and quickly forget the 
material after passing the test. 
The purpose of this retrospective causal comparative study was to see if airman 
knowledge tests scores are related to fatal accidents. Fatal GA accidents that had pilot error as a 
causal factor were compared with those in which maintenance factors caused the accidents, to 
see if there were significant differences in the pilots’ knowledge test scores. The time that 
potential pilots took to answer skill-based questions that required calculation or interpretation 
was compared to the time to answer recall questions to see if rote memorization may have been 
involved in passing the knowledge test. 
  
The results of this paper may have implications on how AFS 630 structures the FAA 
knowledge tests and how instructors prepare potential pilots for these tests. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Improving GA safety is one of the items on the National Transportation Safety Board’s 
(NTSB’s) most wanted list. While the major airlines have few fatal accidents, the NTSB 
continues to investigate approximately 1,500 GA accidents each year. Among many other 
contributing/causal factors in these mishaps, the NTSB cites a lack of knowledge, skills, and 
recurrent training. It notes that: 
Knowledge tests and flight reviews should test for awareness of weather, use of 
instruments and use of “glass” cockpits. And there should be a mechanism for identifying 
at-risk pilots and addressing risks so that both pilots and passengers can safely fly. (p.2) 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2012) 
 According to Campbell and Bagshaw (2002), more that 70% of GA accidents can be 
attributed to human error. They pointed out that pilots must have technical knowledge in 
meteorology, aircraft engines, instruments, and navigation, and also must exercise judgment, 
which is based on knowledge, training, and experience. 
Many studies have been done concerning knowledge as it relates to student learning. Farr 
(1987) indicated that the greater a student learns material or over-learns it by having additional 
practice with it, the slower will be the rate of decay. Students should also learn concepts, 
principles, and rules to supplement rote learning, enabling them to recall details that they would 
not otherwise remember. Other authors have studied the amount of knowledge a person learns 
and the rate of decay. Casner, Heraldez, and Jones (2006) found that material memorized by rote 
is weaker than material processed in a more meaningful way. Ellis, Semb, and Cole (1998) also 
found that material must be well learned to be remembered over time. Knecht (2010) 
acknowledged another issue that may affect aviators: what is learned in the classroom may not 
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transfer to the real world of flight. He indicated that studies conducted in classrooms may not be 
transferable to the flight line. Some feel that the problem lies with the transfer of knowledge 
from the educator to the pilot. Stowell (2008) did not feel that aviators could be held accountable 
for a lack of knowledge leading to an operational error if they never learned the material. 
Accidents can be broken down roughly into human and mechanical failures. Airplanes 
are becoming increasingly more reliable and technically advanced. Amalberti and Wibaux 
(2000) pointed out that accident rates are not decreasing, even though there are fewer dramatic 
mechanical failures—but the rate of pilot cognitive errors is increasing. 
This issue is not unique to the United States. Lenne, Ashby, and Fitzharris (2008) studied 
Australian aviation accidents and found similar pilot error rates. They also found that skill-based 
and decision errors were more likely if the pilot had personal readiness issues of an adverse 
physical or mental state. 
In their studies, Casner et al. (2006) found that regular flying or teaching and biannual 
flight reviews do not keep pilots familiarized with all they have learned. They suggested the 
establishment of some type of standards for ongoing aeronautical knowledge proficiency. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) AFS 630, is responsible for determining if 
airmen have the knowledge and skills to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). The 
agency develops all airman knowledge test guides, knowledge test questions, and practical test 
standards (PTS) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012a). 
The FAA publishes example questions for the variety of knowledge tests used for airman 
testing. Casner, Jones, Puentes, and Irani (2004) indicated that the FAA is concerned that, if it 
published all the questions, applicants would concentrate only on the questions asked in the test 
bank, which might leave gaps in their total aviation knowledge. Because they learned the 
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questions merely by rote, they would not understand the concepts on which the questions are 
based. 
 Statement of the Problem 
What can be done to keep pilots from killing themselves and their passengers? Studies 
have shown who is most likely to be involved in an accident. Trollip and Jensen (1991) found 
that, according to NTSB records, the mostly likely candidate for an accident is 35 to 39 years 
old, has 100 to 500 hours of flight time, and is on a personal flight in visual meteorological 
conditions (VMC). The NTSB (2012) has cited lack of knowledge as a primary or contributing 
cause of many of these accidents. There are several possible causes of this lack of knowledge. 
Pilots may never have learned the material—but with written knowledge tests and oral and 
practical examinations, it seem unlikely that they could pass these exams without the minimum 
basic knowledge required for the rating. If they were successful in attaining their pilot 
certificates, what could have caused them to forget or not apply the material? Retention of 
learned knowledge decreases over time. Farr (1987) determined that deep learning slowed the 
rate of decay. Could it be that many student pilots are passing the FAA knowledge test by rote 
memorization of questions instead of really understanding the material? This could lead to rapid 
decay of knowledge and resulting higher accident rates. 
In the early days of aviation, flying was considered a rule-based skill. Harris and Muir 
(2005) pointed out that flying is now more knowledge-based. The increase in technology has 
caused flying to be more complex, which can sometimes lead to delayed responses and, 
therefore, errors. As a result of that increased complexity, more training is generally required to 
achieve a satisfactory level of performance. 
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Among GA pilots, there is a large difference in accident rates between corporate pilots 
who fly regularly and receive regular recurrent training and pilots who do not receive regular 
training. Hopkins (1994) determined that pilots who received regular check rides generally had 
an accident rate of fewer than one accident per 100,000 miles flown, whereas those who receive 
no regular training have an accident rate near seven accidents per 100,000 miles. He also noted 
that attitude has an effect on flying. Pilots with the attitude to barely meet the FAA minimum 
standards to get their ratings and to never improve or upgrade their skills often end up as 
statistics. 
It has also been determined that accidents involving flight into instrument meteorological 
conditions result in more fatalities than do an equal number of accidents occurring in visual 
conditions. W. Knecht, Harris, and Shappell (2005) found that approximately 32% of fatalities 
involved instrument meteorological conditions. 
 Purpose of the Study 
How can the loss of lives in GA accidents be prevented? It is known that many accidents 
are caused by lack of knowledge. Is it possible that pilots are able to gain a pilot certificate 
without the required knowledge, or does their knowledge base decay over time due to normal 
forgetting? Does depth of learning acquired by superficial or rote learning for the test contribute 
to a faster rate of knowledge decay? 
Questions on the FAA knowledge tests generally fall into two categories. The first is 
define or recall, which can be answered by rote learning. The other type requires calculation or 
interpretation. If a student were able to pass knowledge test by memorizing answers to 
calculation problems without understanding the material, would he or she be a safe pilot? If the 
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student encountered a situation that was slightly different than the scenario in the learning 
environment, could that student apply the knowledge that he or she possesses? 
The FAA has already realized that the knowledge and PTS need to be aligned with each 
other (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012b). The agency has tasked the current Aviation 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) with ensuring that the knowledge questions are 
consistent with the aligned test standards and the principles developed by the previous Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee (ARC). 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the body of knowledge concerning airman 
knowledge testing as it relates to pilot involvement in GA aircraft accidents. It is hoped that this 
will add to what is known about the pilots who are most likely to be in an accident. If it is 
possible to identify such pilots, it may be possible to make changes to our testing methods to 
prevent them from obtaining a pilot certificate without sufficient knowledge or sufficient depth 
of knowledge.  
 Background 
GA pilots are involved in more accidents than are airline pilots. Hackworth et al. (2007) 
gave a number of possible reasons for this. GA pilots generally make more takeoffs and 
landings, which are higher risk maneuvers. Other high-risk operations include aerial application, 
flight instruction, and flights from less-improved runways. GA pilots are also, on the whole, less 
experienced than airline pilots. Campbell and Bagshaw (2002) noted that aviation training 
utilizes knowledge, training, and skill. Knowledge has to be gained before skill can be developed 
and subsequently improved with experience. Croft (2012) is of the opinion that pilots often do 
not have the knowledge, skills, or recurrent training to fly safely, particularly in questionable 
weather conditions. When pilots are in the air, they have limitations which can contribute to 
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them committing errors. Rolfe (1972) pointed out that human factors research shows that man’s 
senses are restricted; he has limited ability to process information, and there are delays before he 
is capable of responding. In studies concerning locus of control, it was found that pilots are more 
internal—that is, they believe they can influence outcomes by their own efforts—than people in 
the general population, who believe outcomes are more due to chance (Stewart, 2008). Pilots 
were also found to be biased toward their own skills and safety. They thought of themselves as 
more skilled and safer than pilots with similar numbers of flight hours. The author suggested that 
internality and self-confidence can promote behavior that promotes safer flying. 
Year after year, the NTSB finds accidents with similar recurring circumstances. The FAA 
has acknowledged this problem for a long period of time. Cole (1967) found that most GA 
accidents were caused by ignorance, complacency, and inadequate flight training. The FAA 
tried, unsuccessfully, to mitigate these problems in 1965 with the General Aviation Pilot 
Education (GAPE) program, which was based on a statistical analysis of accidents occurring in 
1964 and 1965. Information about then-current trends in mishaps was brought to the attention of 
the GA community. Like many of the other programs attempted by the FAA through the years, 
the result was no appreciable change in the fatality rate or numbers of accidents. 
The current FAA knowledge and proficiency program designed to address causal factors 
associated with common pilot errors is the WINGS program (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2011a). Development of this Internet-based knowledge and skill program was based on a study 
of two years of accident data in which the causal factors were compiled by category and class. 
Tasks designed to address these causal factors are designed either as knowledge tasks or flight 
activities. The program has three levels: basic, advanced, and master. Knowledge tasks can be 
accomplished online or at safety meetings sanctioned by the Federal Aviation Administration 
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Safety Team (FAASTeam). The flight activities must be done with a certified flight instructor in 
accordance with the PTS. The flight instructor must go online and verify the activity before the 
airman receives credit for the activity. A pilot must complete all the tasks for a phase of the 
WINGS program within 12 months. Once a phase of the program is completed, it is valid for 12 
months. 
The FAA assembled a panel of experts in 2012 and formed an Airman Testing Standards 
and Training ARC with the following charge: (Hennig, 2012) 
The FAA asked the ARC to review and provide recommendations in four areas: 
1.  A prioritized list of up to five pilot and/or instructor certificates and/or ratings its 
work will address. 
2.  An aeronautical knowledge standard for the selected certificates and ratings. The 
aeronautical knowledge standard for each certificate and/or rating should set 
forth the overall precepts that will conceptually frame, guide, and justify its 
specific technical subject areas. 
3.  Methods for regular industry participation in the planning, development, 
production, and review of technical information (e.g., training handbooks, 
knowledge test guides, and supplements) intended to convey the elements of the 
knowledge standard. 
4. Precepts for development and appropriate review of updated knowledge tests that 
will accurately and reliably measure the airman’s mastery of the aeronautical 
knowledge standard. This task should include recommendations on types of 
questions to be included. (p. vii) 
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 As a result of the ARC, the FAA tasked the ARAC with the following: Combine 
14 requirements from CFR Part 61 for knowledge and practical tests for the private, 
certified flight-instructor and instrument ratings into a single document for each type of 
rating, realign the FAA handbooks with the new standards, and propose a new set of 
knowledge test questions that meet the criteria developed by the ARC. 
 Research Questions 
In relations to the causes of aviation accidents, this research is guided by the question:  
how can the number of GA fatal accidents be reduced? 
1. Do pilots involved in fatal accidents (due to human error) have lower scores on 
FAA knowledge tests than pilots involved in fatal accidents due to mechanical 
failures or with undetermined causes? 
2. Do pilots involved in fatal accidents spend less time per question on FAA 
knowledge tests than pilots involved in fatal accidents due to mechanical failures 
or with undetermined causes? 
3. Do pilots involved in fatal accidents due to human factors errors spend less time  
  on recall questions than pilots involved in maintenance factors accidents. 
4. Do pilots involved in fatal accidents due to maintenance factor spend more time  
  on calculate questions than pilots involved in human factor error accidents.  
 Hypothesis 
Pilots involved in fatal GA aircraft accidents involving pilot error are more likely to have 
been involved in rote learning of FAA questions than pilots dying in maintenance-related 
accidents. 
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 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited in the following ways: 
1. This study used data from those pilots involved in fatal accidents. It is possible 
that they do not accurately represent the total population of those involved in 
accidents or the general pilot population. Maurino (1999) pointed out that, in 
using data from accidents, failed behavior data are being used when studying the 
balance between mission accomplishment and safety. He pointed out that it might 
be better to gain insights into pilot behavior by placing observers in aircraft and 
looking at flights with positives outcomes for the keys to avoiding incidents or 
accidents. This has been done in the airlines by placing trained observers in the 
cockpit with checklists and rating the observable actions that have been 
implicated in accidents or incidents. This error management has been documented 
by Helmreich and Merritt (1998). The age of the pilots was compared to other 
FAA data to see if the ages of pilots who had accidents were representative of the 
average age of pilots in the GA population. 
2.  It is also known that the proportion of accidents associated with violations is 
considerably higher for fatal accidents than for non-fatal ones. The NTSB 
summaries were read to see if any of the accidents appeared to be the results of 
willful violations. 
3. In trying to link multiple-choice questions to safety, Hubbard (2000) believed that 
these questions cannot provide an adequate link to psychomotor skills. Previous 
studies have shown that motor skills account for a small portion of accidents, with 
cognitive and perceptual errors being far more likely causes. 
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4. Another difficult-to-quantify component that can lead to accidents is judgment. In 
his studies, Hunter (2003) looked at a situational judgment test (SJT) as a means 
of determining pilot judgment outside of an actual flight in an aircraft or 
simulator. He believed that it might be useful in certification testing of pilots. This 
is supposed to be covered during practical tests, but it is difficult to do because of 
cost and safety. You may not want to put a pilot in a situation (such as an engine 
failure at low altitude) to test his judgment when a miscalculation could put the 
examiner in a position where he could not recover without a mishap. Driskill, 
Weissmuller, Quebe, Hand, and Hunter (1998) pointed out that, whatever testing 
method may be developed to measure judgment certification process, there was 
no way to assure that pilots would react and make similar judgments when faced 
with the stress and motivations of actual flight conditions. 
5.  A weakness of the study was a lack of randomization. The two groups were 
naturally formed. It may be possible to create equal groups by matching their 
flight ratings. A private pilot from one group could be matched with a private 
pilot from the other group. It may also be possible to create subgroups by flight 
ratings. Because previous studies have shown that about four times more 
accidents were due to human error than mechanical factors, this might result in 
many data not being used. These groups are similar to using intact classroom 
statistics, in which the means have been used successfully. 
 Significance of the Study 
Craig (2013) pointed out that it is possible to predict, with reasonable accuracy, the 
number of GA pilots who would be killed in a year and what they would be doing when they 
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died. He posed the question of whether or not it is possible to teach a pilot out of the next 
accident. Up to the present time, there has not been any linkage between knowledge test scores 
and an increase in propensity for low scorers to be involved in a greater number of accidents 
(over those who scored high on the test) (Hennig, 2012). Other studies have been conducted on 
gender, with Vail and Ekman (1986) coming to the conclusion that women are involved in fewer 
accidents and suffer fewer fatalities in the accidents in which they are involved. When it comes 
to preparing for knowledge test, Trollip and Jensen (1991) made these four observations: 
Studying for the test will probably result in your remembering the information for only a short 
period of time. Rote memorization will not ensure that you understand the material. If 
circumstances are different, you will not have the skills or information to deal with it. Finally, 
tests do not cover all the information that needs to be known, and you may miss an important 
point. 
 Assumptions 
1.  The sample of pilots involved in fatal accidents is representative of the GA 
population. 
2.  The causes of some of the accidents investigated by the NTSB could not be 
determined and were not used in this study. It is assumed that the accidents not 
included in the study would not change the results. 
3.  Knowledge test results are a normal distribution, on which parametric tests will be 
able to be run. 
 Definitions of Terms 
 AFS 630 is the Airman Testing Standards Branch of the Regulatory Support 
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Division of the FAA located in Oklahoma City, OK. 
Check rides is a term used by pilots for a variety of recurrent training evaluations or 
practical tests leading to additional pilot ratings. 
 The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System is a taxonomy that describes the 
human factors that contribute to an accident or incident. 
Instrument Meteorological conditions are those of reduced visibility and cloud height 
above the ground that require additional flight training beyond that required for visual flight. 
The Situational Judgment Test is a test that exposes the taker to a series of hypothetical 
situations and asks the taker to pick the most appropriate response or to rank a series of 
responses in the order of their effectiveness. 
A flight review consists of an hour of ground training and an hour of flight training 
conducted by an instructor within the previous 24 calendar months. 
 The WINGS program is an FAA-developed voluntary pilot education and proficiency 
program. 
 Level C and D simulators are the most sophisticated levels of simulation used by the 
airlines and some turbojet and turbo prop corporate aircraft. 
 A flight-simulation training device does not require a motion system and, for the less 
sophisticated versions, may have a generic airplane cockpit. 
 Abbreviations 
ACS Airman Certification Standards 
ADS-B Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast 
AMT Aviation Maintenance Technician 
AOPA Airplane Owners and Pilots Association 
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ARAC Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee 
ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
ATP Airline Transport Pilot 
CASA Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
CAT Computerized Adaptive Testing 
CATS Computer Assisted Testing Services 
CFI Certified Flight Instructor 
DPE Designated Pilot Examiner 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
 FAASTeam FAA Safety Team 
  
 FBO Fixed Base Operator 
 
FIRC Flight Instructor Refresher Course 
FITS FAA/Industry Training Standards 
FSTD Flight Simulation Training Device 
GA General Aviation 
GAPE General Aviation Pilot Education 
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
IACRA Integrated Airman Certification and Rating Application 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IRA Instrument Rating Airplane 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
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JAA Joint Aviation Authority 
LCU Life Change Unit 
MAC Mid Air Collision 
MANOVA Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
NACO National Aeronautical Charting Office 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NAS National Airspace System 
NCSBN National Council of State Boards of Nursing 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PTS Practical Test Standards 
 SATS Small Aircraft Transportation Systems 
 SJT Situational Judgment Test 
 SRM Single Pilot Resource Management 
 TAA Technically Advanced Aircraft 
 VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual meteorological conditions 
WASP Women Air Force Service Pilots 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
The literature review consists of five parts. The first part deals with learning. Both rote 
and deep learning and the characteristics of each are examined. In the second part, both 
declarative and procedural knowledge are discussed. The third part is devoted to error and how 
this can lead to accidents. In the fourth part, aviation safety—including accident rates, trends, 
and age and gender comparisons—are examined. The fifth part is devoted to knowledge testing 
and linkages to safety. 
There have been many cross-sectional studies in aviation safety research, but there are 
few controlled studies, such as case-control or cohort studies. Li (1994) noted that, unlike studies 
of diseases that have mortality tables, there is no such guide for measuring aviation crashes. 
Most aviation studies have been based on pilot performance criteria, such as psychomotor skills, 
memory, judgment, decision making, or having been involved in an aviation accident. 
 Learning 
Learning can be either rote or deep. According to Billing (2007), motivation is the key to 
which type of learning occurs. He also noted that, if students set self-improvement and learning 
goals, they are more likely to engage in cognitive activities that will improve learning. The 
aviation industry often resorts to the use of mnemonics to memorize important procedures. 
Moore and Telfer (1990) pointed out that this reflects a surface or rote approach to learning. 
 Rote 
Learned material is affected by how it is initially learned (Casner et al., 2006). 
Information that is memorized in a rote manner cannot be remembered as well as material that 
has been studied and is more meaningful (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). This led Casner et al. 
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(2004) to believe that some pilots try to memorize FAA questions to pass the test and that they 
may not understand the material underlying the question. Moore and Telfer (1990) believed that 
surface learners were merely trying to meet the minimum requirement; thus, they used rote 
techniques. In addition, these learners were often able to remember many details but there was 
little structure to their knowledge. Farr (1987) said that concepts should be taught to supplement 
or complement rote learning, allowing students to generate details that would not otherwise be 
available to them. Other studies have shown that rote learning is not conducive to long-term 
memory and, more importantly, that it can decrease a person’s ability to apply what he or she has 
learned (Moebus et al., 2009). Evidence of rote learning can be seen in the time taken to answer 
questions on FAA knowledge tests. In some cases, students took less time to answer the 
questions on a test than it would take the average student to read the question. 
There have been some efforts to look at using quizzes as a learning tool instead of just 
evaluation. Stefansson and Sigurdardottir (2011) looked at systems where students can request 
additional quizzes until a satisfactory result is attained. While this might appear to be rote 
learning, some of the questions were repeatedly assigned with random numbers to distinguish 
between rote memorization and learning with understanding. 
The Government Accountability Office (2011) pointed out that there have been concerns 
from some stakeholders that the current knowledge tests are based on rote memorization. There 
is a concern that pilots focus on memorization rather than developing a true understanding of the 
material. 
 Deep 
Studies have shown that, for deep learning to occur, the material must be made available 
for multiple practice sessions and that it must be presented in multiple ways (Ellis, Semb, and 
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Cole, 1998). This high level of initial learning allows a student to make better selections many 
years later. Deep learners tend to personalize their learning and look for activities that give 
meaning to their study (Moore and Telfer, 1990). 
Some authors conclude that it is not the difference between rote and deep learning that is 
the problem that causes accidents, but the pilot’s inability to assess his or her own level of 
knowledge (Amalberti and Wibaux, 2000). The authors pointed out that the gap tends to 
disappear with experience but that it generally takes at least 600 hours or more than a year of 
concentrated airline flying. Craig (2013) came up with a very similar figure among his study of 
GA pilots. Moore and Telfer (1990) concluded that rote-learning strategies were harmful to 
overall performance. He encouraged deep learning by allowing students to self-question and 
monitor their own learning in an anxiety-free environment. 
Fata-Hartley (2011) concluded that student-centered learning resulted in increased 
student learning. For students to retain knowledge, they must be engaged. The author put it very 
well when he said that learning is not a spectator sport. 
 Bloom’s Taxonomy 
Studies of successful pilots have shown that the elements of Bloom’s taxonomy that are 
most often seen are analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Hubbard, 2000), all of which are upper-
order elements. Pilots are planning, preparing, or performing tasks from the initiation of the 
flight until the final paperwork is completed. Lythgoe (2011) studied the analysis process used 
by Captain Sullenberger when he struck a flock of geese after taking off from La Guardia airport 
in 2009. His first instinct was to return to his departure airfield. A quick mental simulation 
proved this was not feasible, nor was his second choice of Teterboro Airport. His third option 
was the Hudson River, which provided a large flat area to land the aircraft, but landing in water 
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would require a perfect touchdown just above stall speed with the nose slightly high and a 
minimal rate of descent. He was able to safely land the aircraft and direct the evacuation of the 
passengers with no fatalities. As Hubbard pointed out, successful pilots must have a high order 
of analysis and evaluation skills; Captain Sullenberger certainly demonstrated these 
characteristics. 
 Knowledge 
De Jong and Ferguson-Hessler (1996) presented an in-depth article on types and depth of 
knowledge. The authors made a partial list of all the terms that have been used to describe 
knowledge. It would seem that different authors needed many terms to describe knowledge. In 
this paper, Konoske and Ellis’s (1991) definition is used. They divided knowledge into two parts: 
declarative and procedure. Declarative knowledge is facts or knowledge about things, while 
procedural knowledge is how to do something. Adams (1992) indicated that, to demonstrate 
expert cognitive knowledge, a pilot must have a well-ordered body of conceptual and procedural 
knowledge and be able to access it rapidly. The expert is able to retrieve the information more 
readily than novices can; the expert is able to reduce the role of memory search and general 
processing and, because his or her knowledge is more structured, the expert is better able to 
retrieve and recognize patterns and inference. This is especially important when receiving 
sensory signals. Campbell and Bagshaw (2002) pointed out that the signals must be interpreted, 
and pilots must have knowledge from past study and experience in order to correctly process 
those signals. 
It is generally accepted that takeoff and landing constitute the times when pilots have the 
heaviest workload. Schvaneveldt, Beringer, Lamonica, Tucker, and Nance (2000) were able to 
document that it is also the time when the pilot has the requirement for more data per unit of 
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time. In their study, they were concerned with finding the priority data requirements in each 
phase of flight and determining how experienced and novice pilots compared in their assessment 
of priorities. Both experienced and novice pilots rated the approach and the landing as the 
highest priority and most demanding phases of flight. 
There have been many traditional laboratory studies on learning and retention. In many of 
these, there was a rapid loss of knowledge. Semb and Ellis (1994) found that the forgetting curve 
for knowledge gained in the classroom was not nearly as steep as that found in laboratory 
studies. They also found that, by increasing the amount of original learning, one can increase 
retention. Higher-ability students are able to learn more than lower-ability students but, the 
authors did not find any difference in the rate of forgetting. 
Casner et al. (2006) study of retention of knowledge yielded the following observations. 
Recent flight experience appeared to be of more significance than total flight experience, 
especially for flight instructors. Having recently been involved in a flight review or in 
preparation for a practical test seemed to create the climate for better retention. Finally, better 
retention was found in pilots who reported reading more aviation-related materials. 
During World War II, the military conducted many studies on pilot judgment and the 
causes of accidents. Jensen (1995) reported that five factors were repeated by 23% of the pilots 
with multiple accidents. These factors were: 
 A below-average flight record. 
 A below-average adaptability for flight. 
 An excessive grounding history. 
 Lapses of memory and concentration, resulting in incidents. 
 Less education in the accident group. 
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Jensen went on to state that knowledge is essential for coping with emergencies. Going 
beyond, he said that understanding, more than knowledge, is required to fly safely. You can fly 
without understanding, but you cannot fly safely without it. 
In her dissertation about accidents and fatalities in World War II, Pierce (2013) found 
evidence that the Aircrew Classification Battery, which was used to determine who became 
pilots, navigations, or bombardiers, also was a good indicator of pilot-error accidents. Those with 
the highest scores were less likely to be involved in this type of accident. Unfortunately, in GA, 
anyone can train who can afford to learn to fly—not merely those who would be the best 
candidates. 
A significant finding was advanced by Kruger and Dunning (1999), who found that 
knowledge was important in most domains and that people differed in the amounts of knowledge 
that they possess. Their third and most controversial point was that many people made mistakes 
and suffered from their decisions, but they did not realize that they were wrong and continued to 
think that things were fine. This could result from the task being very complex or the person not 
having the knowledge to perform the task. 
Orasanu, Martin, and Davison (2001) noted that, in many accidents, a lack of relevant 
knowledge contributed to the accident by leading the crew to make poor decisions. They also 
believed that lack of current knowledge was an issue. Pilots who recently transitioned to another 
aircraft do not have a great deal of relevant experience, and those who have been away from 
flying for a period of time may lack current knowledge. In some situations, this lack of relevant 
or current knowledge can lead crews to underestimate risks. They may also base decisions on 
past experiences, where they were able to land in poor weather at a certain airport one time; they 
might expect that, even if the conditions are not good, they might be able to do it again. 
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W. R. Knecht and Lenz (2010) called this confidence calibration. Many pilots 
overestimate their ability and judgment and have more confidence in being able to handle 
situations than their current performance warrants. They think they can put forth a maximum 
effort whenever they need it, without looking at factors such as physical health, nutrition, and 
sleep that may prevent them from operating at 100% at any time. 
Another argument advanced by Amalberti (1993) is that it is not the difference between 
superficial and deep knowledge that effects aviation safety but the pilot’s ability to estimate his 
level of knowledge. He indicated that this is especially true for beginners, which he said lasted 
until a pilot had accumulated about 600 flight hours. 
Woods, Johannesen, Cook, and Sarter (1884) had a similar theory, which they called 
knowledge calibration. They indicated that people are well calibrated if they are aware of how 
well they know what they know. The authors said that people are miscalibrated if they are 
overconfident or lacked certain knowledge or if the knowledge they possessed was buggy. This 
is their term for incomplete or erroneous knowledge. 
 Declarative 
A common theme that Craig (2013) found in the accidents he reviewed was that you must 
know the aircraft you fly in order to fly it safely. This should be not just a superficial knowledge 
of the pilot operating handbook for a flight review or an insurance checkout but an in-depth 
knowledge of the aircraft systems. Knowledge tests are usually generic. It would be unfair to ask 
questions about a particular type of aircraft, because a person taking the test may not have flown 
that type of aircraft. The same is true for the avionics installed in an aircraft. On instrument tests, 
the FAA uses National Aeronautical Charting Office (NACO) charts, whereas many airlines, 
such as Delta, use Jeppesen charts for their navigation utilities (Delta Corporate 
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Communications, 2013). Because the FAA does not ask questions about the specific type of 
aircraft a pilot may be flying, the type of avionics equipment installed in the aircraft, or even the 
type of charts the pilot uses for navigation, this can lead to gaps in determining a pilot’s 
knowledge. An examiner should cover these areas during the oral portion of a practical test, but 
there are limits to the amount of material an examiner can cover. In a knowledge test, you cannot 
cover every facet of instrument flying in a 60-question test. Similarly, an examiner must cover 
every task and every area of operation, but he cannot cover all possible facets of aircraft systems, 
avionics, and navigation charts. 
Procedural 
Novice pilots normally respond to situations in a linear, problem-solving approach, 
according to Adams (1992). The pilot usually follows procedures he or she has learned and 
applies rules of thumb. The FAA (2009) advocated the DECIDE model, which is an acronym for 
Detect, Estimate, Choose, Identify, Do, and Evaluate. The expert, on the other hand, can alter his 
rules and create new rules and patterns, even though he may not have previously encountered a 
problem with these characteristics. He often seems to be able to solve problems at a rate that 
makes it appear intuitive. 
Both military and commercial aviation are highly structured environments in which 
checklists have been developed for almost every situation. Shappell and Wiegmann (2003) 
pointed out that situations can be misdiagnosed or unrecognized or the wrong procedure can be 
applied. Procedural errors were found, by Wiegmann and Shappell (1997), to result in more 
minor accidents, whereas decision errors often resulted in major accidents. 
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 Error 
The brain functions as an error-detecting and error-correcting system, according to 
Campbell and Bagshaw (2002). Unfortunately, if it is given insufficient or misleading 
information, it can also be an error-generating system. To make good decisions, the brain must 
have adequate knowledge, skill, and experience, and must have reliable sensory inputs. It must 
also be rested and alert. If a person is tired or preoccupied or is too relaxed or insufficiently 
vigilant, he or she may be more likely to commit errors. 
In a study of time-related human errors, it was found that 90% of these errors occurred 
during the preflight or taxi-out phase, as indicated in Figure 2.1. According to McElhatton and 
Drew (1993), incidents resulting from these errors were often found in the same or succeeding 
phase. They were often not caught on the same phase because these are high-workload periods, 
and the error was sometimes not caught until there was a reduction in workload. A graph of error 
detection would appear to be exponential, with half the errors being detected in the first minute 
and half in the second minute; thus, many of the errors were caught in the first few minutes after 
commission. Errors occurred more frequently when the pilot was under pressure due to 
maintaining a schedule. With combined distractions, schedules, and high workload operations, 
the pilot faced an increased chance of committing errors. The authors further categorized human 
error as cognitive, perceptual, or motor. The cognitive errors were those involving execution 
errors. Cognitive errors accounted for the largest percentage of errors, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
When looking at aircraft accidents, Detwiler et al. (2006) classified errors as skill-based, 
decision, or perceptual errors; decision errors would equate to cognitive errors as described by 
McElhatton (above). Skill-based errors were doing errors—ones involving technique or memory 
and attention. The next errors were decision or thinking errors. These involved inability to make 
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correct decisions on takeoff or landing or during fuel management. The last type of error, the 
perceptual error, resulted from inaccurate use of perceptual information. This can be caused by 
illusions or spatial disorientation and may cause a pilot to make errors in such things as judging 
distances and descent rates. Studies have been conducted to determine the phase during which 
flight accidents occurred. It was determined that 28% of accidents occurred during landing, 19% 
on takeoff, and 12% during approach (Trollip and Jensen, 1991). These are the three times when 
workload is highest for the pilot. 
2-1Operational Phase vs. Error & Incident Occurence 
 
Figure 2-2 Classification of Human Error 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Phase of flight in which error occurred and the phase of flight in 
which an incident occurred as a result of the error.  From “ Time Pressure 
as a Causal Factor in Aviation Safety Incidents: The "Hurry Up" 
Syndrome” by J. McElhatton and C. Drew, 1993, Proceedings of the 
Seventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, April 22-29 
1993, p. 274 
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Figure 2.2 Classisfication of human error.  From “ Time Pressure as 
a Causal Factor in Aviation Safety Incidents: The "Hurry Up" 
Syndrome” by J. McElhatton and C. Drew, 1993, Proceedings of 
the Seventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 
April 22-29 1993, p. 274 
 
Amalberti and Wibaux (2000) pointed out that resources are limited, and pilots often 
have to take into account multiple risks. They want to avoid accidents, but they may be faced 
with information overload and need to guard against a degradation of their personal performance. 
Pilots may face a choice between what they would do in an ideal situation and what they are 
physically or mentally capable of doing. Errors, which can lead to accidents, often resulted. 
Many have come to recognize that errors are inevitable. No matter how hard pilots try to 
prevent errors, they cannot. Boedigheimer (2010) presented a strategy in which a pilot first tries 
to prevent error. If that is not possible, then efforts should be made to try to trap the error before 
it occurs; if the error does occur, then the effects would be mitigated. By “trapping errors,” the 
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author meant that no negative consequences came from the error, or, for practical purposes, it did 
not exist. 
Campbell and Bagshaw (2002) put it another way. Efforts should be made to minimize 
errors occurring as a result of the interactions among software, hardware, the environment, and 
liveware (the human element) and learning to live with the errors which will inevitably result. 
Helmreich and Merritt (1998) developed five precepts for error management, which are 
paraphrased following. 
 Human error is inevitable. 
 There are limits on human performance. 
 Humans make more errors when their limits are exceeded. 
 Safety is a continuum from increased to deceased probability of accidents. 
 High-risk organizations must develop a safety culture. 
A promising area that may have been overlooked is error detection. Sarter and Alexander 
(2000) showed that a lot of effort had gone into developing error classification systems and 
designing error-tolerant systems. They also pointed out that much effort had gone into training 
and design, but relatively little had been done in creating error-detection processes. 
 Aviation Safety 
Amalberti and Wibaux (2000) noted that errors are always going to occur. They will 
happen to people and at a time that one would never expect. Machines, on the other hand, fail in 
predictable times and manners that engineers can model and often easily repair. This contrasts 
with people, who can be unreliable. Engineers often apply more resources to improving 
machines because they think this is the best way they can control safety. There is a linkage 
between safety and training that may sometimes not be obvious. According to Maurino (1999), 
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sometimes safety problems are answered with training changes. Training is also used as a fix 
when design flaws are found after an aircraft is in production. 
In a study focused on the use of safety resources between pilots who had been involved in 
an accident and a group of pilots who had not, the only statistically significant difference that 
Rakovan, Wiggings, Jensen, and Hunter (1999) found was that the non-accident pilots hired a 
Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) more frequently than did the accident group. They also found  
that non-accident pilots were more likely to have attended a safety seminar than the accident 
group—a marginally significant statistic. 
Knecht (2012) conducted another study about pilots involved or not involved in 
accidents. In this study, he looked at the source of training (either FAR Part 61 or 141) and who 
provided the check ride that awarded them their private pilot certificates. The three sources of 
certification were FAA inspectors, schools that had self-examining authority, and designated 
pilot examiners. He also looked at pilots with and without instrument ratings. He set up a 
2x2x3x2 matrix. Several of the cells had fewer than five entries, so he could not use chi-square 
as his statistical tool. He used a log-linear analysis and had only one statistically significant 
finding: that those examined by FAA inspectors had fewer accidents. The author discounted this 
finding because it was based on only 22 events 
Safety attitudes over the years have changed considerably. In 1982, Kinaszczuk, Dodge, 
and Mohler (1982) found that there were very few reports on pilot attitudes, because there was 
reluctance on the part of GA pilots to participate in studies of their attitudes and practices. He 
was able to conduct a study with the Dayton Flying Club and found a higher safety attitude 
among those pilots with more than 500 hours of flight time than among those with fewer than 
500 hours. In 1999, Rakovan et al. (1999) conducted a study of GA pilots on the dissemination 
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of safety information. They surveyed 6,000 pilots and had a response rate of 30.4%— very good 
response rate that showed a change in attitude towards surveys dealing with safety. 
Safety cannot be achieved by rote rule-following. Dekker (2001) noted that situations 
change, and procedures have to be adapted. People have to be flexible and have to look at the 
context in which the rule is being applied. Studies have shown that many incidents occur because 
of errors made during the preflight or taxi-out phase of a flight. Because some of these errors 
occurred during weather decision making, Jensen, Guilkey, and Hunter (1998) conducted a study 
on personal weather minimums and regulatory guidelines for taking off. Personal minimums 
usually are more conservative than the existing regulations. The author was trying to determine if 
a two-hour safety seminar could influence pilots to use personal weather minimums and thus 
avoid takeoffs in weather that could cause pilot problems. He found that pilots considered the 
training helpful, would use personal minimums in their decision making, and would recommend 
the use of personal weather minimums to others. 
Adams (1992) found it remarkable that, with all the effort that pilots make to learn 
meteorology, aircraft performance, systems, and navigation, little effort is put into learning how 
to organize and apply this substantial knowledge. PTS have improved in their requirement to 
include a scenario. Previously, many check rides were a series of maneuvers with little 
resemblance to an actual flight that the pilot would be conducting in the future. Wright (2012) 
wanted to see an additional test added to the knowledge and practical tests that would cover 
planning, risk management, and single-pilot resource management (SRM). 
In recent years, Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) have been produced in large 
numbers. It is not possible to buy a new aircraft equipped with conventional round dials. It was 
thought that these aircraft—with their moving maps, which provide enhanced situational 
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awareness—would lead to a decrease in the accident rate. Wright (2010a) pointed out that these 
aircraft have not led to the expected safety improvements. Using the same old training 
techniques, which rely on rote memorization and traditional training maneuvers, does not 
provide improved results. He believed that concentration on risk management and other higher 
order skills, in order to improve safety, is necessary. He faults the FAA; since the Colgan crash 
in 2009 in Clarence Center, New York, the agency has concentrated on airline pilot training 
instead of making the needed large scale curriculum changes in GA pilot training. 
A new training method—FAA/Industry Training Standards (FITS)—has evolved, which 
has been successfully used with the introduction of TAA. Halleran and Wiggins (2010) cited 
three advantages of FITS. It utilizes scenario-based training (SBT), incorporates risk 
management, and stresses the limitation of TAA systems and systems management. A key 
concept of the FITS training is the development of self-assessment skills; it was hoped that these 
would help make a pilot a lifelong learner. It is hoped that the pilot, by the use of SBT and SRM, 
would move beyond the mastery of individual skills (as in the traditional method of flight 
instruction) toward safe mission accomplishment. 
Decision Making 
Flying is done in a dynamic environment with a variety of weather conditions and time 
and performance pressures. Pilots have to apply the knowledge they have gained to safely pilot 
aircraft (Beard and Geven, 2005). They have to make dozens of decisions, both before and 
during the flight, that affect flight safety. Studies have shown that there is no definite relationship 
between pilot demographics and decision-making tasks (Driskill et al., 1998). There is some 
evidence to show that older pilots, as well as those with more recent and total flight experience, 
tend to take fewer risks. This has been intuitively known for years, as illustrated in a saying 
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attributed to E. Hamilton Lee, an early airmail pilot and a captain for United Airlines in 1949. 
“There are old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots” (PILOT STORIES: No Old, Bold, 
Pilots section) (Smithsonian National Postal Museum, 2004). 
A factor that can affect pilot decision making is stress. In a study of Navy personnel, 
sailors were given a questionnaire that asked about life events that they had recently experienced. 
Events were given a value called Life Change Units (LCU), ranging from 1 to 100; significant 
events, such as death of a spouse, received the highest value of 100. Trollip and Jensen (1991) 
reported that, of those with scores higher than 300, 79% reported illnesses and injuries within a 
year of the life crisis. Another fact reported was that there was a high correlation rate between 
high LCU scores and accident rates. 
Murray (1997) cited the human information-processing system as contributing to the 
problem. Humans tend to have a single decision-making channel, and they process in a linear 
fashion. When people attempt to solve problems simultaneously, these tasks interfere with each 
other. Pilots can sometimes get so engrossed in a problem that they tune out other warnings of 
impending danger, or the brain get bored and does not pick up changes in aircraft performance or 
environmental conditions that could affect the safety of the flight. One of the most striking 
examples of fixation was Eastern Airlines Flight 401 on December 29, 1972. The crew noticed 
an unsafe indication in the landing gear; while attempting to solve the problem, they 
inadvertently disconnected the autopilot and crashed into the Everglades, resulting in the loss of 
112 passengers and crew members (FAA, 2015). This was one of the accidents that lead to the 
introduction of CRM in the airlines. 
Some pilots take a chance; if it works out, it reinforces their risk taking. Hise (2002) 
related a story of a lawyer who was killed on an IFR flight from Albany to Cape Cod. He crashed 
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in the ocean on final approach to the runway. No one will know if he descended below the 
minimum descent altitude while looking for the runway, but he had done so previously, and it 
had paid off. This time, he was not as lucky. 
A pilot often has a wide variety of choices when making decisions. Hopkins (1994) 
promoted pilots making what he called the Most Conservative Response Rule. In his opinion, if 
there is any doubt in a pilot’s mind about the outcome of a decision he is going to make, he 
should always make the more conservation decision. There are always going to be conditions 
that are beyond the pilot’s capability. A professional is able to recognize these situations and has 
the integrity to make sound decisions, even though they may not be the most popular decisions. 
 Pilot Demographics 
While there have been many studies done on the demographics of those pilots involved in 
accidents, there have been few describing the overall demographics of the larger pilot 
population. Hunter (1995) undertook this work; he started with 20,000 pilot records and 
culminated with 6,735 usable returns to use in his 1995 report. This may give us a standard to 
distinguish the characteristics of the pilot population that has been involved in accidents from the 
general pilot population. 
There have been some studies done to try to determine if pilot demographics have an 
effect on aviation safety. In a comparative analysis, Urban (1984) determined that: 
In summary, based on the results of this study, pilots who possess comparatively high 
 levels of education, espouse a liberal political ideology, are among the oldest siblings in 
 their families or orientation, fly professionally, report comparatively more activity in 
 nonflying aviation events, engage in relatively more aviation-related nonconformist 
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 behavior, and comparatively have not been involved in aviation for very long, appear to 
 be more likely involved in aviation accidents. (p. 312) 
In a survey concerning pilot decision making conducted by O'Hare and Chalmers (1999) 
in New Zealand, they were able to determine that exposure (among those surveyed) to hazardous 
events was common. He was able to compare these findings to data developed by Hunter (1995) 
in the United States. From the comparison, it appears that flying is flying. National boundaries or 
societal norms do not seem to affect pilot experience. In another study involved with VFR cross-
country crashes, O'Hare and Douglas (2002) made some interesting discoveries. They analyzed 
crashes involving factors that were externally driven (EXD), such as engine failures, and 
compared them to crashes they called “In Flight Volitional” (IFV) (p. 366), which were mostly 
weather-related or due to loss of control. In this study, they found that the average age of the 
pilots in weather-related crashes was 37.8, while that of those in the externally driven group was 
47. Some of the crash characteristics were also significant; the IFV crashes averaged 2,970 feet 
above sea level, while those in the EXD category averaged 150 feet above mean sea level. In 
terms of fatalities, there were twice as many fatalities in the IFV crashes as in the EXD crashes. 
In looking at the distances of the crash sites from the departure airfields, there was not much 
difference: total EXD crashes were 78.1 nautical miles, and IFV crashes were 72.9 nautical 
miles. If, however, you separate the weather-related and loss-of-control accidents, you find that 
weather-related accidents tended to happen farther away from the departure point (92.5 nautical 
miles) than the loss-of-control accidents (49.7 nautical miles). In another study, O'Hare, 
Wiggings, Batt, and Morrison (1994) looked at information-processing error versus the type of 
pilot certificate held. They found that, 96% of the time, student pilot error could be coded into 
one of six cognitive errors. They found the rate for commercial pilots to be 69% and holders of 
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airline transport rating committed cognitive errors in 50% of their mishaps, which they thought 
to be high for their level of training and experience. They found that diagnostic and goal errors 
were more likely to result in fatal crashes. Their study indicated that errors committed early in 
the chain of events—where an incorrect goal was established or there was incorrect situational 
awareness—resulted in accidents more serious than those with an error later in the chain on how 
to do a particular procedure. 
Of particular note are VFR pilots flying into IMC conditions. Goh and Wiegmann (2002) 
determined that, between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, 19% of the fatalities occurred 
because of this type error. They also noted that fatalities occurred in 72% of these incidents, 
whereas the rate of fatalities in all other accidents was 17%. They also observed that this was a 
worldwide problem, with similar results in Great Britain and New Zealand. In looking at the 
pilot ratings of those involved in these accidents, they found that many of the pilots in accidents 
with other causes had instrument ratings, while few in the VFR-to-IMC accident had instrument 
ratings. A chi square analysis found that ratings versus type of accident were significant. 
In another survey conducted by Vail and Ekman (1986), it was found that men had a 
higher accident rate than women and that men were involved in a higher percentage of fatal and 
serious accidents. In looking at occupations, it was found that doctors, lawyers, sales 
representatives, farmers, and housewives had higher instances of accidents than other GA 
professions. So many doctors were killed piloting the Beech Bonanza that it earned the nickname 
the “doctor killer.” Pierce (2013) found that, during World War II, the accident rate for the 
Women’s Air Force Service Pilots (WASPs) was .05 fatal accidents per 1,000 flight hours, while 
that of the entire Army Air Force was .07 fatal accidents per 1,000 flight hours. 
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Hackworth, King, Cruz, Thomas, Roberts, Bates, and Moore (2007) noted some possible 
reasons for increased accident rates among GA pilots. These included a higher number of 
takeoffs and landings per hour, which are the most dangerous phases of flight. They also noted 
that the types of operations of GA pilots can be more dangerous. These can include agricultural 
flying, which is normally very close to the earth and can be near power and telephone lines, and 
instruction, which involves flying with students with very little experience. Overall, they 
concluded that GA pilots have less experience than commercial pilots, which could lead to their 
higher accident rate. 
In a study of mid-air collisions (MAC), Taneja and Wiegmann (2001) found that the rate 
of MACs has remained fairly constant over the last few years. An interesting distribution of 
pilots involved in these accidents was found. Approximately 38% of the pilots involved had 
fewer than 1,000 hours of flight time. The other peak involved 25% of the pilots having more 
than 5,000 hours. The main cause of these types of accidents was attributed to inadequate look 
out by the pilot/pilots by the NTSB. 
According to Rolfe (1972), no one was born with the ability to operate complex 
equipment. People must have sufficient knowledge and be trained to operate this equipment. GA 
accidents often point out that the cause of many accidents is pilots attempting maneuvers for 
which they have not been trained or that are too difficult for their experience level. He pointed to 
a study of 41 accidents; the pilot in 22 of them had fewer than 150 hours of flight time. He also 
made an observation about recent flight experience when he referred to a study of Royal Air 
Force pilots by Smith (1966), which showed that pilots with fewer than 100 hours of flight time 
in the preceding year had more accidents than the remainder of the pilot population. Smith also 
found that the highest accident rate was among 21- to 23-year-old pilots who were on their first 
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operational assignments. He attributed this to their being freed from the constraints of the 
training environment and being allowed relative freedom in the operational environment. With 
pilots aged 23 to 29, he noted a decrease in the accident rate, which he attributed to an increase 
in experience and skill and the fact that pilots in this age group have good health and a high level 
of physical fitness. 
In a study of air traffic controllers, Oakes, Ferris, Martocchio, Buckley, and Broach, 
(2001) attempted to use personality traits as a predictor of success in becoming a controller. The 
thought was that personality and motivation would be predictors of skill acquisition. They found 
that there was a positive correlation between four of the seven tested personality traits and 
successful controllers. The military has used tests for years in the pilot selection process. While 
selection testing may not be practical in GA—because anyone with the money and the desire can 
take pilot lessons—it may be a tool that could identify those who may have difficulty acquiring 
the necessary skills and thus possibly perform at a lower level. 
 Knowledge Testing 
AFS 630 is the FAA agency responsible for creating and monitoring the administration of 
knowledge tests. Two companies, PSI/Lasergrade and Computer Assisted Testing Services 
(CATS), are contracted by the FAA to administer these tests., which vary in the number of 
questions and the length of time allotted for completion. They generally consist of four types of 
questions—recall, define, calculate, and interpret—all of which are in a multiple-choice format. 
While the first two types of questions are answerable by rote memorization, the last two should 
require the applicant to understand and apply the material. There has been a difference of opinion 
concerning the publishing of the question banks from which questions are drawn for the tests. In 
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2003, the FAA limited the information released about questions to the form of the question but 
did not use the same data. (Casner et al., 2004) 
In 2012, the ARC questioned the reliability and validity of the questions in the current 
knowledge bank. The committee proposed that all questions be returned to the public domain 
(Hennig, 2012). The FAA rejected this recommendation. The agency’s concern is that students 
will study the questions to pass the test and not understand the material. The FAA has had 
concerns for some time about pilots memorizing answers to test questions. With the advent of 
computer testing, the agency has been able to track the amount of time a pilot takes to answer 
individual questions (Casner et al., 2004). It is obvious, as shown in Table 2.1, that some pilots 
complete the test in less time than a normal person needs to merely read the questions. The 
unknown factor is: does the pilot really understand the material, or is he or she memorizing the 
answers in order to facilitate taking the test? 
Table 2.1  
Test Completion Times 
Test Ave. Completion Time Minimum Time 
Private Pilot - Airplane 73 2 
Instrument Rating - Airplane 79 2 
Commercial Pilot – Airplane 91 11 
Note. Time is in minutes. From “ FAA Pilot Knowledge Test: Learning or Rote Memorization” 
by S. Casner, K. Jones, A. Puentes and H. Irani, 2004, NASA/TM-2004-212814, p. 3 
 
There is some concern in the aviation industry that some of the questions in the 
knowledge test bank are dated and that questions involving newer technologies, such as TAA, 
are slow to be added. Goyer (2010) was particularly concerned that there are far too few 
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questions actually related to what pilots are doing when they are flying. He also believed that 
many of the flight-planning questions have answers that are too close together. In real-life flight 
planning, the answer is constantly changing; if ATC gives a slower than expected climb to your 
cruise altitude or if the winds are not as forecast, then the time enroute can vary more than the 
difference in the FAA answers. He felt that the main purpose of close answers is to get many of 
the test takers to choose the incorrect answer. This provides a bell curve and the appearance that 
the test is measuring the knowledge of those taking it. Wright (2010b) was concerned that neither 
the knowledge test bank nor the PTS reflects the latest FAA doctrine and guidance. Those who 
would like to contribute questions to the FAA knowledge test bank may do so by email them to 
afs630comments@faa.gov. 
To correct many of the problems with knowledge testing and the special-emphasis area of 
the PTS, AFS 630 recently published a draft Private Pilot Aircrew Certification Standards 
(Federal Aviation Administration, TBD). Each task has sections for objective, knowledge, skills, 
and risk management. This now unites the knowledge that is needed for a maneuver, the skills 
necessary to perform the maneuver, and the risk assessment and risk mitigation that may be 
necessary prior and during the maneuver. 
 Fixed Versus Adaptive Testing 
The current FAA knowledge tests are fixed form; the number of test questions varies 
from 20, for some helicopter instructor add on ratings, to 125, for the airline transport rating and 
military competency instructor rating (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014d). Ortner and 
Caspers (2011) believed that computerized adaptive testing (CAT) is one of the most outstanding 
technological innovations in the last century. They noted that measurement error is noticeably 
reduced, even when using fewer test items. Weiss and Betz (1973) found that the adaptive format 
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was more reliable and valid than conventional testing. They also found promise that it would be 
fairer for minority groups. There are a couple of features that students do not like when taking 
adaptive tests. Students are not able to go back and review previous questions, and they cannot 
skip questions. If a student were able to go back and change previous answers, he or she may be 
able to game the test. If the next question were harder, the student could assume the previous 
question was correct; if it were easier, that the previous answer was incorrect. If you were 
allowed to skip questions, the computer would not know the level of difficulty that the next 
question should address. 
 Foreign Testing 
In Europe, the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) requires as many as seven tests for the 
private pilot certificate (Casner et al., 2004). Some of these tests may consist of as few as 15 
questions. As in the United States, all questions are multiple-choice format. The JAA does not 
publish a list of currently used questions, but it does publish old questions and similar questions. 
There is a difference in the passing score that an applicant must attain. In Europe, the passing 
score is 75%, but the applicant must attain that score on each of the tests (Government 
Accountability Office 2011). The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) uses a 
system similar to the JAA and does not publish current questions. India uses a system of five 
tests for the private pilot certificate. The questions are multiple-choice and are not published. 
 Other Discipline Testing  
Many other professions utilize knowledge testing in their certification processes. The 
National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) has much tighter controls over test 
information disclosure than does the FAA (AFS 630, 2012). The council copyrights the test and 
makes cheating a criminal offense. The NCSBN provides neither immediate feedback nor 
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detailed information about questions missed. The NSCBN uses a computer-adaptive format, 
whereas the FAA uses a fixed form. 
The Airmen Testing Standards and Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee looked at 
the testing procedures of several other occupations when they were making their report to the 
FAA. The occupations included: Doctor, Nurse, Teacher, Accountant, Air Traffic Control, and 
Coast Guard. Most of them use multiple-choice questions in a computer format. None of them 
have public databases. The ARC recommendations could be influenced by the fact that several 
members of the committee are in the business of producing training material for students 
preparing for knowledge tests. 
 Practical Testing 
Practical tests are conducted by FAA inspectors and designated examiners; in some 
cases, schools have self-examining authority, so their final progress check ride counts toward the 
issuance of the certificate sought. In all cases, the check ride is given in accordance with PTS. 
After successfully completing his or her knowledge test, a pilot fills out an Integrated Airman 
Certification and Rating Application (IACRA), which is approved by the flight instructor before 
an appointment for a practical test can be scheduled. The PTS, according to Wright (2012), 
describe the maneuvers to be conducted and establish an objective measurable minimum 
standard for each maneuver. While the PTS have been improved over the years to include risk 
management and other single-pilot resource management (SRM) skills, Wright did not feel that 
the current construct of the test was adequate for testing these skills. He proposed a three-phase 
test for a certificate. The knowledge and practical tests would be similar to the current tests but 
would include another test that evaluates a pilot’s planning, risk-assessment, and SRM skills 
prior to the practical test. It would be administered in much the same way as the knowledge test. 
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There is some criticism of the PTS in that they rely on performing specific maneuvers 
instead of testing the higher-order skills required of a pilot during an actual flight. Wright (2011) 
wanted to see the expanded use of scenarios to test higher-order skills and a reduction on the 
emphasis of specific maneuvers. 
 Recertification 
Pilots have a certain level of knowledge and proficiency when they are issued pilot 
certificates. However, lack of retention and the forgetting curve affect the amount of knowledge 
a pilot remembers. The FAA attempts to ensure that a pilot is safe by requiring him or her to 
complete a flight review, consisting of one hour of flight and one hour of ground training every 
24 calendar months (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014a). The ground training must cover 
the flight rules in FAR Part 91 and those maneuvers and procedures necessary for the safe 
exercise of pilot privileges. A pilot cannot fail this review. If he or she does not satisfy the 
expectations of the flight instructor conducting the review, the instructor will make an annotation 
in the pilot’s log book that he or she received training, but there is no mention that he or she 
failed the review. The pilot can study and practice and return to the original instructor or seek 
another instructor without any training to see if that other instructor will sign the review. In other 
industries, such as medicine, human resources personnel, auditors, engineers, and quality 
technicians often go through a process of recertification that can consist of examinations or 
continuing education as evidence of continued competency. According to Bashook and 
Parboosingh (1998), a snapshot assessment every seven to 10 years is a crude way of measuring 
the medical skills of doctors. They wanted to see a continuous assessment of their practice and 
evidence of continual learning in their field. 
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The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) sees value in reaccreditation, 
because, in fast-changing fields such as wireless communications, technologies can change 
rapidly, and skills can become outdated (Frantz, 2011). One way the IEEE sees of recertifying is 
to retake the examination, which is continually changed to keep up with changing technologies. 
The test one takes for recertification would be nothing like the test taken five years earlier. The 
test is only a portion of the recertification process. Taking courses, attending professional 
workshops, authoring papers, and speaking at educational sessions are all activities that could be 
considered for professional development points and presented to a panel of wireless 
professionals. Recertification could be awarded for the accumulation of points in a variety of 
categories. 
The American Composites Manufacturers Association has a fairly standard certification 
process. The applicant must take a 100-question, multiple-choice examination that has to be 
taken at a designated computer center or as a written examination with an approved proctor. The 
certification is good for a three-year period. The recertification process consists of reviewing a 
recertification workbook and taking an open-book examination (American Composites 
Manufacturers Association, 2015). 
The only aviation assessment that appears close to the Bashook and Parboosingh or IEEE 
model is that used by Master Instructors LLC to designate masters in the educator, flight 
instructor, and ground instructor designations (Hill and Hill, 2014). This designation is required 
to be renewed biannually. It requires a minimum of 500 hours of activity in five categories, with 
a corresponding minimum number of hours in each category. A panel of peer Master Instructors 
evaluates the activities submitted. Educator is the main category, with a minimum of 250 hours 
of activity required. The other categories are service, media, continuing education, and 
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participant; each category requires a minimum of 30 hours. This program ensures that designees 
remain active as both teachers and learners. 
The WINGS program has previously been discussed as a voluntary program for GA 
pilots to help them build an educational curriculum that is tailored to each pilot’s individual 
flight requirements. It consists of both knowledge and flight activities. There are 22,273 pilots 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2014c) who have earned at least one phase of the WINGS 
program. It would seem possible that this well-established program could serve as a basis for an 
expanded program that could improve upon the one hour of ground and one hour of flight that 
are required every 24 calendar months in our current flight review program. The WINGS 
program includes a history of participation that is maintained in a computer database; it provides 
recommended activities, based on the pilot’s profile, for each level of the WINGS program. 
There are seminars that are scheduled by FAASTeam members and online training that can be 
taken. This includes not only FAA training but also training offered by the Aircraft Owners and 
Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety Institute, Civil Air Patrol, and many other organizations 
that have courses, seminars, and flight training eligible for inclusion in the program. 
The segment of the pilot population with the fewest accidents is professional airline 
pilots. The last accident by a U.S.-scheduled passenger-carrying airliner was an accident by a 
regional airline, Colgan, in February 2009 in Clarence Center, New York. In this accident, 50 
people lost their lives. Since that time, there was a Boeing 777 crash in San Francisco involving 
a foreign carrier, Asiana Airlines, and an Airbus 300 crash in Birmingham, Alabama, by United 
Parcel Service, a cargo carrier. 
GA pilots cannot be held to the same training frequency, duration, or intensity as airline 
pilots; however, looking at airline pilot training may offer some clues to their remarkable safety 
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record. Airlines fly and train according to the regulation set forth by the FAA (2014b) Part 121, 
Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations. All flight-crew 
members are required to undergo initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent training. Recurrent 
training is required annually for all crewmembers, and pilots in command are required to 
complete an additional training period within the previous six months. For pilots of group II or 
turbojet aircraft, this training has to consist of a minimum of 25 hours. There is also a 
requirement for demonstrating proficiency in a series of maneuvers in a flight simulator. These 
simulators are exact replicas of actual aircraft. Levels C and D simulators must have a motion 
platform with 6 degrees of freedom and a visual depiction of 150 degrees horizontally and 30 
degrees vertically (FAA, 1991). 
 Maintenance 
A study of maintenance-related accidents that occurred between 1988 and 1997 found 
that 1,474 or 7.1% of all GA accidents had at least one maintenance-related error as a cause of 
the accident (Goldman, Fiedler, and King, 2002). Because of limitations on NTSB coding of 
accidents, this is probably conservative, as other military and GA studies have shown accident 
rates up to 20%. On average, 18% of the maintenance accidents resulted in fatalities. Pilot and 
maintenance errors account for most accidents. Once an accident is determined to be 
maintenance-related, little further investigation is conducted. Many of these accidents are 
probably caused by human error. The most significant type of maintenance error appears to be 
installation errors. The two types that resulted in the most GA deaths were reverse installation 
and using the wrong part. 
The aviation maintenance technician (AMT) is primarily concerned with the safety of the 
aircraft on which he is working (Patankar, Brown, and Treadwell, 2005). Once an AMT gets 
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promoted to a managerial position, the focus often switches from safety to profit. Eliminating 
pilot errors and maintenance mechanic errors would eliminate most accidents. 
 Future Systems 
 To improve aviation safety, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
has established the Small Aircraft Transportation Systems (SATS) to increase the safety of 
single-pilot GA operations. Snyder, Sokoloff, and Bearden (2003) envisioned a co-pilot in a box 
for GA pilots. These systems would improve pilot situational awareness by performing some of 
the information-management and communications tasks now done by co-pilots. They would also 
be able to conduct error monitoring, by checking fuel status and monitoring for actions, such as 
going below the minimum descent altitude on an approach, that would violate regulations. Such 
a system would also be able to do environmental monitoring of such things as airport status, 
changes in the weather, and airspace availability. With the increases in avionics technology, 
pilots can become saturated with data. This new technology would give us the possibility of 
filtering this information to present to the pilot the items that are more important for situational 
awareness. 
 In a GA study conducted by Saleem (1996), three pilots conducted an IFR flight to the 
Roanoke airport, utilizing a safety pilot and an ethnographic observer. On all three flights, the 
pilots made mistakes. After studying the situations, Saleem came up with the following as 
possible solutions. It may be possible to filter communications traffic heard by the pilot. Few of 
the many radio calls on a frequency assigned to a pilot actually are to or from him, yet he must 
listen to them all. Displays to reduce the burden on working memory could show heading, 
altitudes, and other information that a pilot must know, remember, or take the time to write on a 
knee board. The last suggestion is one that the FAA is actively pursuing. It involves auditory and 
45 
visual traffic information displays to help pilots locate and avoid other airplanes. Air traffic 
controllers currently provide this service to IFR traffic and upon request (and depending on how 
busy the controller is) to VFR traffic. Some aircraft are equipped with traffic-collision avoidance 
systems, which sense the emission from the other aircraft’s transponder and produce auditory 
and visual representations of the other aircraft’s position. At the current time, not all aircraft are 
required to have a transponder, so the system will not report these aircraft. In the future, all 
aircraft with be required to have a system called Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B), which will assist pilots in all phases of flight but especially in busy terminal areas. 
 Summary 
   GA accidents continue to occur at a rate far in excess of airline accidents. Within the GA 
statistics, pilots who are subject to regular recurrent training have fewer accidents than pilots 
who meet the minimum requirement of the regulations, which is a flight review every 24 months. 
Women are safer pilots than men; men aged 35 to 39 who have 100 to 500 flight hours and are 
on personal flights in VMC conditions are most likely to be involved in accidents (Trollip and 
Jensen, 1991). The most likely causes are a lack of knowledge, complacency, and inadequate 
flight training. What is not known—and is hoped to be a contribution to the body of knowledge 
by this paper—is determination of a link between knowledge test results and accident statistics. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
 The purpose of this study was to see if there is any relation between accidents and FAA 
knowledge test results. Quantitative methods were used in the study. Data were collected in an 
Excel spreadsheet, in which simple calculations were made; data were then loaded in SPSS for 
more involved calculations. Data were obtained for this study from AFS 630, which obtained the 
accident data from the NTSB. AFS 630 maintains the database of knowledge test questions and 
the results of all knowledge tests administered by their two contractors.  AFS 630 took the data 
from the NTSB and located the test results for the pilots who had been involved in fatal 
accidents. Once the test scores were married with the accident data, the results were de-
identified. 
 Research Questions 
This research was guided by the following questions, in relationship to the causes of 
aviation accidents. How can the number of GA fatal accidents be reduced? 
1.  Do pilots involved in fatal accidents due to human error score lower on FAA 
knowledge tests than pilots involved in fatal accidents due to mechanical failures? 
2.  Do pilots involved in fatal accidents due to human error spend less time per 
question on FAA knowledge tests than pilots involved in fatal accidents due to 
mechanical failures? 
3.  Do pilots involved in fatal accidents due to human factors errors spend less time  
  on recall questions than pilots involved in maintenance factors accidents. 
4. Do pilots involved in fatal accidents due to maintenance factor spend more time  
  on calculate questions than pilots involved in human factor error accidents.  
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Accident data 
Accident data were drawn from the NTSB database for the period 1/1/2009 to 
12/31/2011. Of the 802 fatalities, 139 had taken a knowledge test between 1/1/2008 and their 
deaths. Data prior to 1/1/2008 were excluded to minimize changes due to lack of retention or 
changes in experience level. The accident reports include FAA remarks, NTSB remarks, and the 
NTSB findings. The NTSB findings list things that were determined to be a cause or a factor in 
the accident. Based on previous studies, it was anticipated that, in approximately 10% of the 
accidents, the NTSB (or, in some cases where the investigation was delegated to the FAA), the 
causes of the accidents would not be able to be determined. In the remaining cases, 
approximately 75% of the accidents would be due to human error, and approximately 25% of the 
accidents would be caused by mechanical errors. Based on the sample size, this should have 
provided approximately 14 accidents of undetermined origin, 94 accidents caused by human 
error, and 31 caused by maintenance problems. 
 Knowledge Test Data 
Of the 139 pilots who had taken knowledge tests, some had taken multiple exams. The 
examination results provided by AFS 630 included the type of examination, date, and score. For 
each question, the following information was provided: learning statement number and verbal 
description, which indicates if it was a recall, define, calculate, or interpret type of question; 
whether the question was correct or incorrect; and the number of seconds that were spent 
answering the question. Because each pilot had to pass the appropriate knowledge test to obtain 
his rating, scores fell mostly between 70 and 100. There were a few scores below 70, in which 
pilots failed a test for the next higher rating but were still able to fly at their then-current ratings. 
The questions that were of more interest were the calculate or interpret questions, which are skill 
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questions. These are questions that should take longer to answer than knowledge questions, 
which can rely on rote memorization. Looking at the average time to answer skill questions may 
provide an indication if a particular pilot memorized the answers. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
variables that were used. 
Table 3.1  
Variables 
Variable Variable 
Description 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Date of Birth  14 Feb1927 4 Nov 1992   
Date of 
Event 
 
 30 Jan 2009 20 Dec 2011   
Type of 
Accident 
Either 
Human 
Factors or 
Maintenance 
 
11 
Maintenance 
Related 
106 Human 
Error 
Related 
  
Type of Test There were 
21 total types 
of tests 
7 types of 
tests with 1 
participant 
 
IRA 26   
Date of Test  9 Jan 2008 29 Jul 2011 
 
  
Score Total Score 
for the test 
 
52 98 84.38 8.776 
Calculate 
Time 
Average time 
to complete 
each 
calculate 
question 
 
27 374 147.55 68.488 
Recall Time Average time 
to complete 
each recall 
question 
 
 
15 126 48.15 21.892 
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Total Time Total time 
for test. Max 
3 hrs or 
10,800 
seconds 
 
760 10745 5211.69 2185.432 
Calculate Score on 
Calculate 
questions 
 
45 100 81.62 13.19.6 
Recall Score on 
Recall 
questions 
 
51 100 85.37 9.216 
Age at time 
of event 
 18 84 42.42 14.236 
 Control Procedures 
Because this was a retrospective causal-comparative study, it was not possible to use 
randomization to select an experimental and control group. The two groups that were used can 
more accurately be described as comparison groups. A method of equating the two groups that 
could be used is matching. Because it is known from previous studies that there are three to four 
times more pilot-error accidents than maintenance mishaps, using this technique reduced the size 
of the sample considerably. In this study, it was more feasible to compare two subgroups of the 
accident population: those where pilot error was the cause and those with causes originating from 
mechanical events. There are a small number of accidents for which the NTSB could not 
determine a cause. These were not used in the study. 
This proposal was submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Kansas State 
University, which determined that this was a Non-Research Application. It does not require 
review by the Committee for Research Involving Human Subjects. 
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 Data Analysis 
To analyze the data, a variety of descriptive and inferential statistics were used. Because 
test scores should vary between 70 and 100 and test times cannot exceed 3 hours, the mean was 
used to measure central tendency. Some pilots may have failed a knowledge test. In that case, the 
pilot rating held may be different from the last test result. The median might be more appropriate 
if a wider distribution of scores or times were expected. The mode would be an unstable 
measure. 
The pilots in the study are all deceased GA pilots. Their demographic data (age and total 
flight times) were compared to previous studies to give an indication of whether the sample was 
representative of the pilot population. The FAA publishes national averages of pilot ages by type 
certificate. The average age of the deceased pilots was compared with the average from the FAA 
data. The group was then divided, as indicated by the NTSB, into those involving pilot error and 
those that had mechanical failures. 
The data were examined to determine if there were any outliers. Care was taken to 
remove the outlier only if it was not from the intended population sample. If the distribution 
appeared to be skewed by the outliers, it may have been necessary to apply transformations to 
the data. This also would have been necessary if the Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance 
was significant. As a last resort, the score could be changed using one of several methods. Only 
test results related to flight were used. Any accident, in which the pilot’s last test was 
maintenance or air traffic control, was removed. 
Variance was used to determine the standard deviation, which is the most stable measure 
of variability. It was used to see if scores were clustered around the mean. Assuming that 
knowledge test results are normally distributed allowed the more powerful parametric testing to 
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be used. Sample sizes between human-factor errors and maintenance failures were expected to be 
different. These different samples were not expected to cause any problems, due to the 
robustness of the ANOVA. 
For the first research question, an ANOVA was used on the test scores to see if there 
were significant differences. For a group of data, Field (2009) suggested that use of an F-statistic 
or F-ratio would be appropriate. ANOVA is an omnibus test, so it is an overall effect. It does not 
tell specifically what the effect is. If the test is significant, it can be concluded that the means are 
significantly different. The ANOVA itself will not distinguish between groups. If there were a 
control group, planned contracts could be done. Since there were no control groups, post hoc 
tests were done. There were about 18 post hoc tests available in SPSS. Some were eliminated, 
based on sample sizes. The number of samples in each group and the differences in sample sizes 
among groups helped in the selection of post hoc tests. If a test was too conservative, a small 
difference would have been rejected when it was, in fact, meaningful. Because samples sizes 
were expected to be very different, Gabriel’s and Hochberg’s GT2 was appropriate for use. If the 
population variances were different, the Games-Howell procedure was run. In the options box, 
Brown-Forsythe and Welch was selected. These tests were useful if the homogeneity of variance 
assumption was broken, which was known by looking at Levene’s statistic. If the test were 
nonsignificant—i.e., p > .05, then the variances were roughly equal. 
For the second question, the time spent on knowledge test questions, a slightly different 
procedure was followed than that used for test scores. Different FAA knowledge tests have 
varying numbers of questions, and the ratio between the numbers of calculate and recall 
questions can vary from test to test. For this question, the calculate time and recall time per 
question were used. An ANOVA was used to compare the calculate and recall times per question 
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of the groups. Outliers were checked, since it is known that the longest FAA test is three hours. 
Because the sample sizes in this question were almost identical to question one, the same post 
hoc tests and option tests were run for this question as for the knowledge test scores in question 
one. 
The next issue was to see if there is any relation between questions answered correctly or 
incorrectly and the time taken to answer the questions. Using two groups, those with pilot errors 
and those with mechanical failures, a Factorial Anova were performed. Different FAA tests have 
different numbers of questions, so it was necessary to look at the percentage of questions 
answered correctly and not the number of questions answered correctly or incorrectly. Looking 
at the times for responding to both knowledge questions and calculate questions was performed. 
Scores were selected as the dependent variable and time and type of accident as the fixed factors. 
Results began with descriptive statistics showing means and standard deviations. Next, Levene’s 
test for equality of error variances was examined for significance. If the value of the Levene’s 
test was significant (p < .05), the variances were significantly different. If the value of the 
Levene’s test was not significant (p > .05), there was not sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis. The main ANOVA table was then examined to see if there was a significant main 
effect for time. The significance value had to be less than .05. Contrast was also examined. 
Again, the significance had to be less than .05. A post hoc analysis was run and interpreted as if 
it were a one-way ANOVA. 
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Chapter 4 - Results of the Study 
The data in this chapter are presented to answer the four main research questions. Initial 
results include overall descriptive charts and statistics, followed by the four research questions. 
In a study by Trollip and Jensen (1991), they found that, in the late 1980s, the profile for pilots 
most likely to have an accident was 35 to 39 years old. The results of this study showed a 
somewhat older group, with a mean of 44. Looking at the statistics published by the FAA for the 
years 2002 to 2013, the age of our accident population is virtually the same as the average age of 
active pilots, which lends support to the fact that our sample population was representative of the 
general pilot population. There has been a decrease in the number of private pilot certificates 
issued, from a high of more than 50,000 in 1979 to about 25,000 in 2013. While we generally 
think that the pilot population is aging, the statistics show that the average age of a pilot has 
remained virtually the same. In 2005, a new category of pilot certificate, the sport pilot 
certificate, was instituted. This certificate attracts a group of pilots who are older than the 
average. The statistics do show a slight decline in the average age of student pilots. Since 2007, 
airline pilots have been allowed to continue flying past age 60 and until age 65. This may have 
had the effect of increasing the average age of pilots holding an airline transport pilot (ATP) 
rating. It is interesting to note that, while the average age of a student pilot has gone down by 
two years, the average age of a private pilot has increased by two years. There has been a marked 
decrease in the average age of a recreational pilot, from 51 to 44 years old. Recreational pilots, 
however, make up a miniscule percentage of the overall pilot population. In 2013, there were 
only 238 recreational pilots among the almost 600,000 active airmen certificates held. 
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    Table 4.1  
    Age Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Age at time of 
death 
117 18 84 42.42 14.236 
 
Table 4.2  
Average Age of Active Pilots by Catagory 
Type of Pilot Certificates 
Calendar  Total  Student  Sport Recreational Private  Commercial  Airline  
Year  1/        2/  2/  Transport 2/ 
2013 44.8 31.5 55.2 44.8 48.5 45.4 49.7 
2012 44.7 31.5 54.7 47.8 48.3 44.8 49.9 
2011 44.4 31.4 54.4 48.8 47.9 44.4 49.7 
2010 44.2 31.4 53.8 50.8 47.6 44.2 49.4 
2009 45.3 33.5 53.5 50.4 47.1 44.2 48.9 
2008 45.1 33.6 53.2 50.1 46.9 44.8 48.5 
2007 45.7 34.0 52.9 52.4 48.0 46.1 48.3 
2006 45.6 34.4 52.9 51.5 47.7 46.1 48.1 
2005 45.5 34.6 53.2 50.9 47.4 46.0 47.8 
2004 45.1 34.2 N/A 51.3 47.0 45.9 47.5 
2003 44.7 34.0 N/A 51.5 46.5 45.6 47.0 
2002 44.4 33.7 N/A 51.0 46.2 45.5 46.6 
Note. As of DECEMBER 31, 2013. 
1/ Includes helicopter (only) and glider (only). 
2/ Includes pilots with an airplane and/or a helicopter and/or a glider and/or a gyroplane 
certificate.  
Pilots with multiple ratings will be reported under highest rating. For example a pilot with a 
private helicopter and commercial airplane certificates will be reported in the commercial 
category. 
N/A Not available. Sport certificate first issued in 2005. 
From “US Civil Airmen Statistics” by the Federal Aviation Administration, downloaded 
July 10, 2014, from 
http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/civil_airmen_statistics/2013/ 
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The average score on the FAA knowledge test was found to be 84, with a range from 52 
to 98. The FAA passing score for the knowledge test is 70%. There were five pilots who had 
failed a knowledge test but were still flying. This amounted to 4.3% of the 117 pilots involved in 
human-error or maintenance-related accidents. All five pilots with failing scores were involved 
in human-error type accidents. The length of time from their failed tests until their fatal accidents 
varied from 8 days to 30 months. In looking at the means for the most common types of tests, the 
following results were obtained: PVT, 85%; IRA, 84%; and CAX, 83%. These scores are all 
very close to the mean of all tests; if the scores are normally distributed, between 70 and 100, 
they are close to what you would expect for the mean. 
        Table 4.3  
        Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Score Test 117 52 98 84.38 8.776 
Looking at the mean scores by accident type, the pilots involved in human-error accidents 
had lower test scores, with a mean of 84%, than those involved in maintenance-related accidents, 
with a mean of 87%. The mean for undetermined accidents fell between the means for human 
error and maintenance factors—which is understandable, since those accidents could result from 
a combination of human factors and maintenance factors. The FAA or the NTSB may have been 
unable to determine the cause of these accidents for a variety of reasons. There may have been 
no survivors or witnesses, the wreckage may not have been recovered or may have been too 
badly destroyed by fire, or, in some cases, there just were not conclusive indications of what 
caused the accident. In looking at the standard deviations, the smallest was that of the 
undetermined group. Their scores were closer to their mean than either the human-error or 
maintenance-factors groups. 
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      Table 4.4  
      Type Accident Statistics 
Type Accident Mean N Std. Deviation 
1 84.16 106 8.880 
2 86.55 11 7.725 
3 84.50 16 5.774 
Total 84.40 133 8.454 
      Note. Human Error=1; Maintenance Factor=2; Not Determined=3. 
In looking at the percentage of calculate questions answered correctly versus recall 
questions, pilots were less successful in calculate questions (81.5 %) than they were with recall 
questions (85.3%). There is a difference in the minimum scores of the calculate questions (45) 
and the recall questions (51). There is a difference in the number of pilots answering calculate 
questions versus recall questions because one military competency test had only recall questions. 
The calculate question had a wider range, and the standard deviation is larger, suggesting that the 
scores were more spread out. 
     Table 4.5  
     Calculate Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Calculate % 132 45 100 81.50 12.758 
      
      Table 4.6  
      Recall Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Recall % 133 51 100 85.36 8.866 
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 Research Question 1 
For the first research question—looking at knowledge test scores and the relative rank of 
those involved in human-factors related accidents as opposed to maintenance-related ones, or 
those of unknown origin—the results of Levene’s test and the results of an ANOVA were 
examined. For the Levene’s test F(2, 130) = .120,  > .05. The results of our ANOVA show that 
> .05.   
      Table 4.7  
       Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
2.155 2 130 .120 
  
  Table 4.8  
  ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 56.879 2 28.439 .394 .675 
Within Groups 9377.001 130 72.131   
Total 9433.880 132    
 
Since there were no significant differences, post hoc testing was not warranted. Again, all 
of the significance values are greater than .05. As such, there is no significant difference in the 
knowledge test scores between those involved in human factors and those in maintenance-factor 
accidents. 
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 Research Question 2 
Research question two looked at the time the pilots took to answer questions. Tests vary 
in the length of time allowed for completion, so looking at the average time to complete the test 
did not provide any useful data, because the types of examinations taken by the pilots probably 
differed between the types of accidents. Looking at the mean number of seconds it took pilots to 
answer calculate and recall questions was of interest. Pilots took an average of 152 seconds to 
answer calculate questions versus 48 seconds to answer recall questions, which was expected. 
What was unforeseen was that pilots involved in human-error accidents took longer on both 
calculate question (149 seconds to 136 seconds) for maintenance-related accidents and for recall 
questions (49 seconds to 41 seconds). It was thought that those involved in human-factors 
accidents would be rote learners and would respond to questions more rapidly than those 
involved in maintenance-factor accidents. 
     
     Table 4.9  
     Calculate Time Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Calculate time 132 27 374 151.74 70.640 
Note. Time in seconds. 
 
     Table 4.10  
     Recall Time Descriptive Statistic 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Recall Time 133 15 126 48.00 21.222 
Note. Time in seconds. 
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Table 4.11  
Calculate Time Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std.  
Error 
95% Confidence Interval  
for Mean 
Minimum 
Lower  
Bound 
Upper 
 Bound 
1 105 148.75 70.400 6.870 135.13 162.38 27 
2 11 136.09 47.302 14.262 104.31 167.87 62 
3 16 182.13 80.611 20.153 139.17 225.08 51 
Total 132 151.74 70.640 6.148 139.58 163.91 27 
Note. Human Error=1; Maintenance Factor=2; Not Determined=3. 
Table 4.12  
Recall Time Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound a 
Upper 
Bound Minimum 
1 106 48.85 22.261 2.162 44.56 53.14 15 
2 11 41.45 17.369 5.237 29.79 53.12 21 
3 16 46.88 15.987 3.997 38.36 55.39 17 
Total 133 48.00 21.222 1.840 44.36 51.64 15 
Note. Human Error=1; Maintenance Factor=2; Not Determined=3. a 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
 
For the Levene’s test F(2, 130) = .181,  > .05. There was no significant difference in the 
recall or calculate times between our groups, as shown with the results of our ANOVA. Again 
Bonferroni was not needed. It is interesting that the not-determined group fell between the 
human-error and maintenance-factor groups (in research question one) in looking at their 
knowledge test scores. In research question two, they took considerably longer in answering 
calculate questions than in either the human-error or maintenance-factor groups. In looking at the 
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recall times, they once again fell between the groups. Again, the difference in N between 
calculate time and recall time was due to a knowledge test having no calculate questions.  
       
      Table 4.13  
      Test of Homogeneity of Variances Total Time 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.732 2 130 .181 
 
 Table 4.14  
 ANOVA Total Time 
 
Sum of  
Squares df 
Mean  
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 7164003.796 2 3582001.898 .689 .504 
Within Groups 676063527.723 130 5200488.675   
Total 683227531.519 132    
  
 Research Question 3 
Research question three looked to see if there was any relation between questions that 
could be answered by rote memorization and the time taken to answer the questions. In the 
descriptive statistics, the mean for the human-error accident for recall was 85%, while the mean 
for the maintenance-factor group was 89%. This difference was significant when we looked at 
the Levene’s test. In looking at the averages by times within each group, they share the common 
pattern that they scored highest on the median times. The longer or shorter the time they spent on 
a question, the lower the average score they received. 
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 Table 4.15  
 Dependent Variable: Recall % 
Type Accident  recall time 
recoded1 Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 .00 85.71 8.115 34 
1.00 86.13 7.550 39 
2.00 82.76 11.953 33 
Total 84.94 9.332 106 
2 .00 88.80 10.826 5 
1.00 90.50 4.950 2 
2.00 89.75 1.708 4 
Total 89.45 7.118 11 
Total .00 86.10 8.404 39 
1.00 86.34 7.462 41 
2.00 83.51 11.493 37 
Total 85.37 9.216 117 
          Note. Human Error=1; Maintenance Factor=2. 
 
For the Levene’s test, F(5, 111) =.003  < .05. This shows that there was a significant 
difference between group means. 
          Table 4.16  
           Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Dependent  
          Variable: Recall % 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
3.840 5 111 .003 
Note. Variances tests the null hypothesis 
that the error variance of the dependent 
variable is equal across groups. 
 
To exam this difference, a factorial ANOVA was set up, using the recall percentage as 
the dependent variable; the type of accident and the recall time, transformed into a nominal 
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numeric input, were independent variables. The resulting test of between-subjects effects showed 
> .05. 
Figure 4.1 shows that both the human-error and maintenance-factors pilots scored best 
when they took a median amount of time to answer questions. If they took too short or too long a 
period of time to answer the questions, their scores were lower. This was especially true of 
human-error pilots who took longer to answer questions. Their scores varied from a high of more 
than 86, for the median times, to less than 83 for those taking longer to answer the questions. 
     
Figure 4.1 Estimated Marginal Means  
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In looking at Table 4.19, the F-Ratio is not significant, since the > .05. This means that 
the time was similar. We conclude that, other things being equal, the human-error and the 
maintenance-factor group took approximately the same time to answer recall questions. 
Table 4.17  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Recall % 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 439.668
a
 5 87.934 1.037 .400 
Intercept 264837.060 1 264837.060 3122.837 .000 
TypeAccident 
 
201.905 1 201.905 2.381 .126 
recall1 21.843 2 10.921 .129 .879 
TypeAccident 
* recall1 
30.163 2 15.082 .178 .837 
Error 9413.528 111 84.807   
Total 862504.000 117    
Corrected Total 9853.197 116    
 
In looking at the Helmert contrast on effects of time, we find that > .05. The confidence 
level also crosses 0, which is another indication that it is not statistically significant. 
           Table 4.18  
          Contrast Results (K Matrix) Dependent Variable Recall % 
                                    Helmert Contrast  
Level 1 vs. Level 2 Contrast Estimate -4.819 
Hypothesized Value 0 
Difference (Estimate – Hypothesized) -4.819 
Std. Error 3.123 
Sig. .126 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Difference 
Lower Bound -11.009 
Upper Bound 1.370 
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In looking at the post hoc tests, the Bonferroni and Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-Welsch Range 
results showed that the differences in time are not significant, in that the > .05. 
Table 4.19  
Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Recall % 
 
(I)  
recall time  
recoded1 
(J)  
recall time  
recoded1 
Mean 
Difference  
(I-J) 
Std. 
 Error Sig. 
Bonferroni .00 1.00 -.24 2.060 1.000 
2.00 2.59 2.113 .669 
1.00 .00 .24 2.060 1.000 
2.00 2.83 2.088 .535 
2.00 .00 -2.59 2.113 .669 
1.00 -2.83 2.088 .535 
 
  Table 4.20  
  Recall % 
 recall time 
recoded1 N 
Subset 
1 
Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-
Welsch Range
a
 
2.00 37 83.51 
.00 39 86.10 
1.00 41 86.34 
Sig.  .387 
Note. Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on observed means. The error term is Mean 
Square(Error) = 84.807. a. Alpha = .05. 
 Research Question 4 
 
Research question four looked to see if there is any relation between questions that 
required calculation to answer and the time taken to answer the questions. In looking at the 
descriptive statistics, the mean of the human-error group was 81.6%, while the mean of the 
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maintenance-factor group was 81.3%. For those pilots involved in human-error accidents, those 
who took shorter times to answer questions attained a higher percentage of correct answers. For 
those involved in maintenance-factor accidents, the opposite trend was observed. For this group, 
the longer they took to answer the questions, the higher their scores. This result has to be 
tempered with the observation that there were only 11 accidents of this type; in dividing them by 
time, only one accident fell in the longest-time category. The standard deviation of the calculate 
percentage consistently fell between 12 and 14. For the Levene’s test, F(5, 110) = .518,  > .05, 
which was not significant. 
Table 4.21  
Dependent Variable: Calculate % 
Type Accident  
calculate time 
recoded Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 .00 84.37 12.345 38 
1.00 82.03 12.131 31 
2.00 78.44 14.502 36 
Total 81.65 13.181 105 
2 .00 76.67 13.429 3 
1.00 80.71 14.009 7 
2.00 100.00 . 1 
Total 81.36 13.981 11 
Total .00 83.80 12.414 41 
1.00 81.79 12.305 38 
2.00 79.03 14.732 37 
Total 81.62 13.196 116 
          Note. Human Error=1; Maintenance Factor=2. 
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          Table 4.22  
          Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Dependent Variable:  
          Calculate % 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.850 5 110 .518 
Note. Variances tests the null hypothesis 
that the error variance of the dependent 
variable is equal across groups. 
 
 
To answer this research question, a factorial ANOVA was set up using the Calculate % as 
the dependent variable and the type of accident and the calculated time transformed into a 
nominal numeric input as the independent variables. The resulting test of between-subject effects 
shows > .05. This difference was not significant. 
Table 4.23  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Calculate % 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power
b
 
Corrected Model 1072.516
a
 5 214.503 1.245 .293 .054 6.225 .428 
Intercept 161423.510 1 161423.510 936.885 .000 .895 936.885 1.000 
TypeAccident 100.571 1 100.571 .584 .446 .005 .584 .118 
calculate1 236.226 2 118.113 .686 .506 .012 1.371 .163 
TypeAccident 
calculate1 
620.225 2 310.113 1.800 .170 .032 3.600 .369 
Error 18952.794 110 172.298   
   
Total 792810.000 116    
   
Corrected Total 20025.310 115    
   
 Note. TypeAccident; Human Error=1; Maintenance Factor=2; Not Determined=3. 
a. R Squared = .054 (Adjusted R Squared = .011) b. Computed using alpha = .05 
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 Figure 4.2 Estimated Marginal Means 
  Table 4.24  
  Contrast Results (K Matrix) Dependent Variable  
  Calculate % Helmert Contrast 
 Level 1 vs. Level 2  
Contrast Estimate -4.179 
Hypothesized Value 0 
Difference (Estimate – Hypothesized) -4.179 
Std. Error 5.469 
Sig. .446 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Difference 
Lower Bound -15.018 
Upper Bound 6.660 
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  Table 4.25  
  Calculate % 
 
calculate time 
recoded N 
Subset 
1 
Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-
Welsch Range
a
 
2.00 37 79.03 
1.00 38 81.79 
.00 41 83.80 
Sig.  .265 
Note.Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) 
= 172.298.a. Alpha = .05. 
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Chapter 5 - Summary and Discussion of the Results 
This final chapter is designed to summarize the design and methodology and to discuss the 
results with implications and possible future research recommendations. The study was 
conducted to see if there were any connectivity between the results of FAA knowledge tests and 
those GA pilots involved in fatal accidents. Four areas were investigated. The first was a 
comparison of knowledge-test results of those pilots involved in accidents (with pilot-error 
origins) to the test results of pilots with accidents involving maintenance factors or which were 
of undermined origin. The second research area involved the length of time per question that it 
took pilots to complete the knowledge test. The third area involved looking at the length of time 
it took pilots to answer recall questions and their relative success in doing so. The last research 
question looked at the time per question it took pilots to answer calculate questions and their 
success in answering them correctly. 
In looking at the descriptive statistics, 4.3% of the 117 pilots involved in the study had 
failed a knowledge test between eight days and 30 months of their fatal accidents. All were 
involved in human-factors accidents, which results in 4.7 % of human-factors error pilots flying 
after failing a knowledge test. In her dissertation about accidents and fatalities in World War II, 
Pierce (2013) found evidence that the Aircrew Classification Battery, which was used to 
determine who became pilots, navigations, or bombardiers, also was a good indicator of pilot-
error accidents. Those with the highest scores were less likely to be involved in this type of 
accident. Because these pilots demonstrated a lack of knowledge for the next rating, the FAA 
may want to institute a policy that requires a check of a pilot’s knowledge for the rating that they 
hold if they fail a knowledge test. The FAA may consider additional flight training following 
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failure of a knowledge test or even denial of flight privileges until the pilot can demonstrate 
proficiency in an aircraft to an FAA inspector, Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE), FAASTeam 
member, or CFI designated by the FSDO. 
In examining the types of questions answered correctly, pilots answered 85.3% of the 
recall questions but only 81.5% of the calculate questions. This could indicate that the pilots did 
not have an in-depth understanding of the material, so they were not able to calculate the correct 
answer. Another possibility was their methods of preparation for the test. If they engaged in 
memorization of the answers in the practice tests provided by commercial vendors, they would 
be in a position to answer the recall questions but may not have understood the material 
sufficiently to be able to answer the calculate questions. Previous studies have shown that 
information that is memorized in a rote manner cannot be remembered as well as material that 
has been studied and is more meaningful (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). 
The FAA has traditionally used a passing score of 70% of the total questions asked on the 
test. A pilot could fail all the questions in a particular area and still pass the test. The FAA may 
want to consider raising the minimum passing score on an examination. An alternative may be 
available with the implementation of Airmen Certification Standards (ACS). It may be possible 
to combine ACS with adaptive testing. If a pilot chooses an incorrect answer on a knowledge 
question on a particular task, additional questions would be asked within that task. If, after 
additional questioning, the algorithm determined that the task was unsatisfactory, as with the 
current PTS, it would make the area of operation unsatisfactory, and the applicant would be 
given a failure for the test. As in current practical testing, the applicant could be notified that he 
has failed the test, and the test could be terminated at that point, or he could be allowed to 
continue to take the test, to see if he can pass the other areas of operation. Test results would be 
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by area of operations rather than one score for the entire test. During retesting, it might be 
appropriate to test only the area of operation that the applicant failed. This would reduce the 
number of questions asked and reduce the exposure of the questions to applicants who may 
memorize the questions and pass them on to commercial test-preparation companies. This would 
make FAA testing similar to JAA testing which involves seven separate knowledge tests that 
have to be passed (Casner et al. 2004).  In this case the applicant would have to pass each of the 
appropriate areas of operation which would be combined into one test. 
There should be more of an attempt to preserve the integrity of the test. The NCSBN has 
much tighter controls over test information disclosure than does the FAA (AFS 630, 2012). The 
council copyrights the test and makes cheating a criminal offense. The maximum FAA penalty 
includes the possibility of revocation of ratings for one year for cheating. The definition of 
cheating might be expanded to include passing on questions asked during the test. While 
criminal penalties might be a possibility, if the test were copyrighted, this would probably be 
excessive. 
 Discussion of Research Findings 
  The results of the first research question initially seemed to be a significant finding, when 
the mean of the human-error knowledge test results was 84% that of the maintenance-related 
accidents was almost 87%. While continuing the analysis, the Levene’s test F(2, 130) = .120,  > 
.05. This shows that, while there is a difference in the average knowledge test result, it is not 
significant. An attempt was made to look at the results of an individual type of test, but because 
there were 27 types of test involved in the results, the sample sizes were so small that meaningful 
data could not be obtained. The test results of pilots involved in maintenance accidents came 
from seven different types of tests with no more than two pilots involved in accidents from any 
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specific type of test. The largest number of tests was the instrument rating airplane with 26 tests; 
of these, 24 were from pilots involved in human-error type accidents, and only two were from 
those involved in maintenance-error accidents. Because the time allowed and number of 
questions assigned to each type test varied, it was not possible to use the total times for the tests 
in any meaningful comparison in question number two. The average calculate time and recall 
times per question were used for this research question. Unexpectedly, the average time per 
question was more for pilots involved in human-error accidents than it was for those involved in 
maintenance-related accidents for both calculate and recall times. It had been assumed that the 
times for pilots in human-factors error would have been less. The results were not significant as 
Levene’s test F(2, 130) = .181,  > .05.  It was thought that they might be more superficial 
learners, using rote memorization for answers, and therefore would have answered more quickly. 
In research question number three, the recall correct percentage was used as the dependent 
variable; the type of accident and the calculated time transformed into a nominal numeric input 
were the fixed factors. The mean for the pilots involved in human-error accidents was 84.94, 
whereas the mean for those involved in maintenance errors was 89.45. For the Levene’s test, F(5, 
111) = .003  < .05. When the average time to answer a recall question is ignored, those involved 
in maintenance-related accidents scored significantly better than those who were involved in 
human-error related accidents. It could be that the pilots in the maintenance-factor group were 
deep learners. They may have understood the material better and were able to apply their 
knowledge when confronted with questions that were similar but not the exact wording of those 
that they may have studied. In the fourth research question, the average calculate time was used 
as the dependent variable, and the type of accident and the average calculate time per question 
were the fixed factors. The mean for those involved in human-error accidents was 81.65, 
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whereas the mean for those involved in maintenance accidents was 82.36. For the Levene’s test, 
F(5, 110) = .518 >.05. It can be concluded that, other things being equal, those involved in 
accidents of both human factors and maintenance-related errors took the same amount of time to 
answer calculate questions and received similar scores. 
 
 Implications for Safety 
  The GA fatality rate has been slowly improving as aircraft have become more reliable 
and TAA provide the pilot much more situational awareness. This has been somewhat offset by 
the fact that TAA aircraft are more complex and, by themselves, do not lower accident rates; 
they can cause information overload for some pilots. FITS training programs, when used in 
conjunction with TAA, appears to improve risk management and develop self-assessment skills, 
which lead to life-long learning and a focus on safe mission accomplishment rather than 
individual tasks. Wright (2010) believed that concentrating on risk management and other 
higher-order skills is necessary to improve safety. He faulted the FAA for concentrating on 
airline pilots when it is the GA curriculum that needs attention. These self-assessment skills are 
important, as many accidents result from pilots’ overconfidence in their knowledge or their 
ability to handle situations that may arise. Rakovan et al. (1999) determined in a study that a 
group of pilots not involved in accidents flew with a certified flight instructor more often than a 
similar group of pilots who had been involved in an accident. Casner et al. (2006) found that 
being involved in a flight review or preparing for a practical test created the climate for better 
retention. 
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Implications for Testing 
 
Semb and Ellis (1994) found that there is not an appreciable difference in the forgetting 
curve between higher- and lower-ability students and that you can increase retention by 
increasing the amount of original learning. Orasanu et al. (2001) found that relevant knowledge 
was essential to good decision making. Lack of current knowledge can lead to pilots 
underestimating risks. Wright (2010a) believed that concentrating on risk management and 
higher-order skills is the way to improve safety. It may be that testing should reduce the number 
of recall questions and add questions of the calculate or interpret type, which could include risk 
analysis and scenario-type questions that could more thoroughly test higher-order skills. Hunter 
(2003) believed that SJT might prove useful in the certification of pilots. Goyer (2010) believed 
that questions should relate to what a pilot is doing in the cockpit and eliminate many of the rote 
questions that do not improve safety but only show that the pilot had a good instructor helping to 
prepare for the test. If adding SJT and more calculate or interpret questions would cause tests to 
exceed the number of questions that are currently in each test, a possible solution would be to use 
adaptive testing. This technique can reduce the number of questions in a test (Thompson and 
Weiss, 2011), whereas some authors believe that it more accurately measures those test takers 
whose grade is farther from the mean. 
 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
A study could help to see if a system of continuing education makes for safer pilots. 
There are two programs that involve continuing education. Both have previously been 
mentioned: the WINGS program and the master certified flight instructor program. With the 
cooperation of the FAA, a study could be devised so that a group of pilots participating in the 
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WINGS program is paired with a group of pilots who are not in the program, and their safety 
records could be compared over a period of time. Because we are dealing with a sufficiently 
large pilot population—about 600,000 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014),—a random 
sample of those who are active in the WINGS program and those who are not could be taken and 
statistically compared, to see if there is any difference in the safety records of the two 
populations. 
 Master instructors go through a process of continuing education, service, media 
development, participation, and teaching. There have been more than 1,700 applications for this 
designation, but many of the masters have received the designation as many as nine times. A 
study involving the 158 current master instructors (Hill and Hill, 2014) who are listed on the 
Master Instructor LLC website and a group of instructors who have not gone through this 
process may prove valuable. Instructors can renew their instructor ratings by: passing a practical 
test, with a record of recommending at least five students for ratings and achieving a passing rate 
of 80%; having a record of being a company check pilot or some position requiring the regular 
evaluation of pilots; taking an approved flight instructor refresher course (FIRC); or being in the 
military and passing an armed forces military instructor proficiency check. Some of these 
methods of renewal require little or no continuous educational activity between checks. The 
FIRC is often used by instructors who are no longer active but do not want to allow their flight-
instructor ratings to lapse. Each attends a 16-hour course and receives a certificate to submit with 
the application to renew the rating. They do not have to demonstrate proficiency in an aircraft. 
There is a testing component to the FIRC (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). It consists of 
a minimum of 30 multiple-choice questions. At least 15 of the questions must be at the end of the 
training; the other 15 questions can be spread throughout the 16 hours of the program. If a pilot 
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does not meet the minimum of 70%, he or she can retrain until reaching 100%. Only deficient 
areas need to be retested, but the same questions cannot be used. 
There have been 1,700 applications for master educator since 1997 (Hill and Hill, 2014). 
There are currently about 98,000 certified flight instructors, according to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (2014). Each master instructor’s record could be paired with an instructor of 
similar years of experience and flight time; those data could be analyzed to see if there are any 
significant differences in the accident history of the two groups. 
Another possible study that could be of benefit is to look at the accident history of the 
pilots who have earned at least one phase of the WINGS program and compare them with a 
representative sample of those who have not participated in the WINGS program. The FAA 
estimates that there are 599,086 active pilots (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014), so there is 
a large sample from which to draw. Those who have participated in a phase of the WINGS 
program have demonstrated a level of concern for safety that may not be present in the 575,000 
pilots who have chosen not to participate in the program. 
Another area that could be examined is a longitudinal study involving retraining or 
recurrent training for a group of GA pilots, along the lines of that done by the airlines. This 
training could be done annually and involve fewer than the 25 hours required by the airlines. It 
might be done online or with local seminars using a training approach similar to the WINGS 
program, so that there would be few travel expenses for the academic portion of the training. 
Instead of expensive level C and D simulators, less expensive flight-simulator training devices 
(FSTDs), found at many fixed-base operators (FBOs) or collegiate aviator programs, could be 
used. While FSTDs are used primarily for instrument training, many of them have visual systems 
that could be used for private pilots without instrument ratings. More frequent flying with a flight 
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instructor was a distinguishing factor found by Rakovan, et al. (1999) in a non-accident group, 
compared to a group that had been involved in accidents. This study would see if similar results 
could be attained. 
The final proposal recommended for future study is CAT or adaptive testing. Using CAT 
appears to provide an economy of questions and time and an increase in validity and reliability. 
A study just comparing results of the current fixed form versus CAT would probably not yield 
any meaningful results. If the questions in a test using CAT were truly representative of cockpit 
activities, used SJT, and truly measured higher-order skills, it may be a predictive tool similar to 
the Aircrew Classification Battery that Pierce (2013) found as an accurate predictor of pilot 
accident rates during World War II. 
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